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I. INTRODUCTION
Equal justice under law is not merely a caption on the facade of the Supreme Court
building. It is perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our society. It is one of the ends for
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which our entire legal system exists ... [I]t is fundamental that justice should be the
same, in substance and availability, without regard to economic status.
1
[T]he United States provides less money for legal services than any other Western
industrial country except Italy.
2
In 1996, Congress passed a budget act containing the most
restrictive set of legislative limitations on the Legal Services
Corporation ("LSC")-the private, nonprofit organization responsible
for administrating federal funding for and facilitating access to legal
services for low-income people across the nation 3-in the tumultuous
history of that entity.4  Designed to forestall advocacy and
representation activities viewed as undesirable by those in political
power, 5 these restrictions mandated that those organizations to which
1. Lewis Powell, prior to his tenure on the Supreme Court, speaking in his capacity as the
president of the American Bar Association, as quoted in Michael A. Mogill, Professing Pro Bono:
To Walk the Talk, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 5, 7 (2001) (citing NAT'L LEGAL AID
AND DEFENDER ASSN, LEGAL SERVICES: THE UNMET PROMISE 1 (1995)).
2. Mogill, supra note 1, at 11 n.35 (citing Mary Wisniewski Holden, Clipped Wings and
Budget Cuts Tax Legal Aid, CHI. LAW., Aug. 1997, at 59).
3. Douglas S. Eakeley, Role of the Legal Services Corporation in Preserving Our National
Commitment to Equal Access to Justice, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 741, 742; Rhonda McMillion,
LSC Down But Not Out: With Reauthorizations Stalling, ABA Carries on Fight for Legal
Services, 82 A.B.A. J. 118, 118 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Susan D. Bennett, On Long-Haul Lawyering, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 774-
75 (1998):
[In 1996,] Congress withdrew from Legal Services grantees the funding, the stability,
and the professional discretion to elect forms of delivery of legal services-class
actions, community organizing, legislative lobbying-that might support more
expansive or systemic representation. This action merely continued a process of
curtailment of capacity for broad-based lawyering that began the minute that Legal
Services offices received their first federal funding...
See also Symposium, Ethical Issues Panel, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 357, 360 (1998) [hereinafter
Ethics Panel]:
[W]hile LSC programs have at a number of different points in time had some
restrictions placed on the type of clients that could be represented, or even on the type
of actions that could be brought, what had never been done before [1996] was to
impose restrictions on the legal arsenal of tools available to a client once a person was
determined eligible and the case involved an acceptable subject matter.
5. See, e.g., William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid:
Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960s to the 1990s, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 241, 241 (1998) (quoting Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1996) (statement of Kenneth F.
Boehm, Chairman, National Legal and Policy Center)):
From the very inception of the legal services program up until today, the controversies
which marked the program have been the same. In the name of helping the poor,
program resources were used to promote political and ideological causes. Lobbying,
congressional redistricting cases, abortion litigation and legal attacks on welfare
reform and laws against welfare fraud all served to mark this program as being a far
cry from the traditional legal aid offered to the poor by the legal profession over the
years.
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the LSC awarded funds refrain from engaging in any of a wide variety
of previously permissible actions (for example, assisting incarcerated
persons in civil proceedings and encouraging other people to engage in
political activity).6  The restrictions also further foreclosed some
actions that had long been restricted for grantees (for example, class
actions and lobbying).7 The LSC quickly promulgated regulations
following these restrictions, with which its grantees had to comply or
lose their funding. The combination of restrictions and regulations
has resulted in an increasingly cramped mandate for LSC grantees,
compounding the already dire situation in the United States with
respect to low-income people's access to the legal system.
When President Richard Nixon signed the LSC into being in
1974,8 the goal was to fund two lawyers representing the low-income
population (hereafter "legal-services lawyers") for every 10,000 low-
income people in the nation 9 (of whom there were then approximately
29 million). 10 Today, the LSC itself estimates that it provides only a
single LSC-funded legal-services lawyer for every 11,500 low-income
people.11 By contrast, the country's population contains one lawyer for
every 240 people above the eligibility cutoff. 12 Millions of Americans
See also McMillion, supra note 3, at 118 ("Critics say that LSC lawyers should not take on cases
beyond the bread-and-butter basics, and that no LSC funds should be used in areas such as
legislative redistricting, lobbying, abortion-related litigation, political activities or class actions.
These restrictions were attached to the LSC appropriations legislation for fiscal 1996.").
6. Jessica A. Roth, It Is Lawyers We Are Funding: A Constitutional Challenge to the 1996
Restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 107, 107-08 & n.15
(1998).
7. Id.
8. Legal Services Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (1974) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2006)) [hereinafter the LSC Act or the Act].
9. Eakeley, supra note 3, at 742; ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAM IN 2003, at 4 (2003), available at
http://www.clasp.org/publications/Legal-Aid-2003.pdf [hereinafter Houseman 2003].
10. Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for Low-Income Persons: Looking Back and
Looking Forward, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1213, 1221 (2002) [hereinafter Houseman 2002].
11. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 6 (2004),
available at http://www.lsc.gov/about/budget/FY05BReq.pdf [hereinafter LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST 2005]. One scholar puts the number slightly higher, at one
lawyer for every 9,000 eligible people. David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault On
Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 211-13 (2003). The LSC's recent
publication on "the unmet civil legal needs of low-income Americans" calculates the numbers
somewhat differently. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN
AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2005),
available at http://www.lsc.gov/press/documents/LSC%20Justice%2OGap-FINAL1001. pdf
[hereinafter LSC, JUSTICE GAP]. Grouping together all legal-services lawyers-both those funded
by the LSC and those working for non-LSC-funded organizations-the Justice Gap report
specifies a ratio of one legal-services attorney per 6,861 income-eligible people. Id. at 16.
12. Luban, supra note 11, at 211-13. The Justice Gap report bases this calculation on the
number of lawyers providing specifically civil legal assistance to the general population, which
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are eligible for legal services, but the vast majority of those millions go
without any legal assistance whatsoever. Congressional funding for
the LSC reached its highest level (adjusted for inflation) a quarter of a
century ago in 1981,13 following what has turned out to be the
program's only four-year period of strong Democratic governance to
date, under President Jimmy Carter.14 Since that time, as the
political climate has become more conservative and the successive
administration and congressional perceptions of the LSC and its
target clientele have become correspondingly less beneficent, the
LSC's very existence has been threatened with some regularity.
15
Among other things, its budget has shrunk substantially in real
terms, even as the need for the services it funds has increased. 16 The
1996 restrictions and resulting LSC regulations exacerbate these
problems in at least two ways: by limiting the ways in which legal
services can be offered to income-eligible persons and by eliminating
from eligibility entire groups of people who need help and would be
entitled to it on income grounds.
These restrictions also negatively affect both the private bar
and legal-services lawyers, who handle most of the representation the
income-eligible population receives. One important area in which
these effects are felt is that of professionalism. Seen through an
ethical lens, professionalism requires lawyers to transcend the bottom-
line orientation of their profession and to serve such overarching goals
as social justice and public interest. A more practical view of
professionalism highlights qualities including autonomy and honesty.
Both views place an extremely high value on the quality of service
given to the client-the essence of the work that lawyers do.
Unfortunately, the LSC Act and the regulations promulgated
pursuant to that Act and its revisions contain internal contradictions
regarding these basic aspects of professionalism. These contradictions
present legal-services lawyers with one set of potentially unresolvable
appears to be approximately half the country's population of active lawyers. LSC, JUSTICE GAP,
supra note 11, at 16; Mkt. Research Dep't, American Bar Association, National Lawyer
Population By State 3 (2005), http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/2005nbroflawyers
bystate.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ABA, National Lawyer Population] (noting
that the number of active lawyers in the United States in 2005 totaled 1,104,766). This
calculation yields "a ratio of one attorney per 525 people." LSC, JUSTICE GAP, supra note 11, at
16.
13. Houseman 2002, supra note 10, at 1221.
14. I am indebted to Professor Frank Bloch for outlining the political context of the 1981
peak for this child of the 1980s.
15. See infra notes 182-184 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's repeated
attempts to end or severely restrict the LSC).
16. Houseman 2002, supra note 10, at 1221; Houseman 2003, supra note 9, at 4.
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dilemmas, and the bar as a whole with another, related set.
Furthermore, the Act and the regulations alike run afoul of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct established by the American Bar
Association ("ABA").
17
A second legal area affected by the restrictions is pro bono
work, typically performed by private lawyers as a complement to their
regular positions and responsibilities. There has been and continues
to be both an enormous need for pro bono and a shortage of willing
and able practitioners thereof. This tension results in part from the
legislatively mandated limitations that have encumbered LSC
grantees from the time of the LSC's inception. The Office of Economic
Opportunity ("OEO")18 recognized that a case-by-case approach to
legal-aid issues could only plug holes in an already crumbling dam. It
believed that systemic efforts addressed to "fundamental community-
wide issues"1 9 promised a far more efficient and effective resolution of
such issues.20 Indeed, in its early years, the Legal Services Program
("LSP") engaged in precisely this sort of reform-oriented activity along
with its regular casework.21 The changes that Congress has made in
the LSC's governing rules over the years, however, have forced LSC
grantees to abandon any meaningful efforts at law reform and to
return to the individual-case model that the LSC's precursors
specifically rejected. By definition, law reform aims at solving the
same or similar problems for multiple individuals and groups. 22 Thus,
the forced move away from such large-scale reform has contributed to
the increase in the number of people needing individual legal
assistance.23 Unfortunately, as the number of poor in the United
States has risen, the number of lawyers working in legal-services
areas has declined. In addition, for a variety of reasons, many
members of the private bar whose pro bono contributions might
partially compensate for that decline cannot or do not provide such
services.
17. The Model Rules form the basis for the ethical codes governing lawyers' behavior at the
state and federal levels.
18. The OEO was the administrative parent of the original federal Legal Services Program
("LSP") that preceded the LSC.
19. Such issues are typically short-handed in legal-aid scholarship and discussion as "law
reform."
20. Quigley, supra note 5, at 246-48.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Other contributing factors include the increase in the overall population of the United
States, the increase in the number of U.S. residents eligible for and desirous of legal-aid services,
and the increase in the complexity of problems facing both aid-eligible people and the lawyers
striving to help them.
2006] 975
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Legal aid to low-income people thus stands beset on every side.
One possible solution to the dilemma facing eligible Americans and
lawyers of all stripes would involve untying the hands of LSC grantees
and the members of the private bar who choose to assist them. This
could be done in two ways: by funding them fully and by removing
from their work the restrictions imposed by Congress. Doing so could
accomplish four interrelated goals: (1) free the lawyers best suited by
training and inclination to poverty law to practice their chosen types
of law effectively; (2) reduce the pressure on members of the private
bar to perform pro bono work; (3) allow both legal-services and private
lawyers to engage in their profession in ways that comport with its
expectations of professionalism; and (4) substantially better serve the
millions of poor in this country in the fundamentally American pursuit
of life, liberty, and happiness.
24
Part II of this Note outlines the ongoing crisis in legal services
for low-income people from two different angles, briefly painting the
picture of poverty in the United States today before explaining at
somewhat greater length the LSC and the restrictions under which it
operates. After providing an overview of the concept of
professionalism, Part III discusses how that complex paradigm plays
out under the LSC Act for both legal-services lawyers and their
private-bar colleagues. It points up the tension between the law's
expectations of its practitioners and the ways in which those
expectations are sometimes frustrated under the Act and the resulting
regulations. It also argues that this tension places those who provide
legal services under ethical burdens that threaten the quality of those
services. Part IV describes both the inadequate funding of the LSC
itself and the failure of other sources of funding to make up for that
federal shortfall. It discusses the fact that this uncertain financial
situation further endangers legal services in both quality and
quantity. Part V outlines the funding-increase and restriction-
relaxation suggestions alluded to above, suggesting some specific ways
in which these suggestions might be implemented and briefly
discussing the potential effects on legal services. It concludes by
reiterating this Note's central concern with equal access to justice for
all.
24. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.").
976 [Vol. 59:3:971
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II. "STATISTICS DON'T BLEED" 25: LACUNAE IN LEGAL SERVICES AND THE
GOVERNMENT'S PUZZLING RESPONSE
A. The Un- and Underserved: Crisis as Status Quo
Often, one significant adverse legal result, such as the termination of public benefits,
can be the difference between survival and disaster.
2 6
The United States finds itself in the middle of a legal-services
crisis.27  Every year, millions of low-income Americans run into
trouble with their housing, their benefits, their health care, their jobs,
and their families 28 -trouble the law and its practitioners could fix,
alleviate, or offset. Every year, the majority of those millions go
unserved for various reasons: because they are unaware or do not
believe that their problem can be solved legally;29 because they know
the law could help but do not have access to legal services or do not
realize they are eligible for such services;30 because they seek
assistance from a legal-services program but are denied it "because
25. Arthur Koestler, On Disbelieving Atrocities, in THE YOGI AND THE COMMISSAR 88, 92
(Danube ed. 1965) (quoted in Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers
and Law Students, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2415, 2431 (1999) [hereinafter Rhode, Cultures of
Commitment]).
26. Tigran W. Eldred & Thomas Schoenherr, The Lawyer's Duty of Public Service: More
Than Charity?, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 367, 373 (1993).
27. See, e.g., Memorandum from Bill Whitehurst, Chair, ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid
and Indigent Defendants, to Helaine Barnett, President, LSC, ABA's 2006 Budget
Recommendations to LSC (Aug. 24, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter ABA 2006 Budget
Recommendations] ('Various credible studies-state and national-continue to show that despite
the combined efforts of legal aid programs and private bar pro bono attorneys, as many as 80% of
the legal needs of people in poverty are not addressed in any way."); LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST 2005, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that 80% of aid-eligible U.S.
residents lack access to civil legal services); Margaret M. Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se
Clinics a Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law Schools
Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1883-84 (1999) ("The American Bar Association's
('ABA') Comprehensive Legal Needs Study reports that fewer than three in ten of the legal
problems of low-income households are brought to the justice system.... The study found that in
seventy-nine percent of the low-income households having legal problems, no lawyer was
involved."); BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, STRUGGLING TO MEET THE NEED: COMMUNITIES
CONFRONT GAPS IN FEDERAL LEGAL AID 6 (2003), available at http://www.brennancenter.
org/resources/atj/atj8.pdf [hereinafter BRENNAN CENTER 2003] ("Some 45 million low-income
Americans meet the financial qualifications for LSC-funded representation, and LSC-funded
programs strain to provide services to about 1.4 million of them a year .... ); Robert Hornstein
et al., The Politics of Equal Justice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1089, 1091 (2003) ("[I]t
has been estimated that only one-eighth of the legal needs of poor people are addressed.").
28. Eldred & Schoenherr, supra note 26, at 372-73.
29. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 369, 380-81 (2004); LSC, JUSTICE GAP, supra note 11, at 13.
30. LSC, JUSTICE GAP, supra note 11, at 13.
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the program lack[s] sufficient resources";31 or perhaps because their
legal issues require actions the legal-services office in their area is
prevented by law from taking on their behalf.
3 2
To be eligible for legal-services assistance, a potential client
applying for aid must have a family income under 125 percent of the
poverty level. 33 In 2005, the poverty level for a single person living in
the District of Columbia or one of the forty-eight contiguous states
stood at $9,570, making the cut-off for legal services $11,962.50. 34 To
put this into perspective, a single person working forty hours a week,
fifty-two weeks a year at the federal minimum hourly wage of $5.15
would gross only $10,712 before taxes.35 By that standard, at least
forty-three million Americans are eligible for publicly funded legal
services. 36  This statistic lines up with the spectrum of need in a
variety of other related areas. For example,
[t]he federal government reported that in 1999, during our most prosperous period in
decades, thirty-one million people were food insecure-that is, they experienced or
feared hunger. During the same year, 3.5 million people-including 1.35 million
children-were homeless at one time or another. Forty-two million Americans remained
without health insurance. The Census Bureau recently reported that for the first time in
eight years, the number of Americans living in poverty increased.
3 7
31. Id. at 5. This particular problem is so acute that the LSC estimates that "for every client
served by an LSC-funded program, at least one eligible person seeking help will be turned
down." Id. (emphasis omitted).
32. See infra notes 69-84 for a discussion of the restrictions Congress levied on the LSC in
1996 as a condition of continuing its funding and of the effects of those restrictions on the
representation available to income-eligible persons.
33. Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2663 n.127 (1993) ("LSC
regulations supplement statutory eligibility factors enumerating maximum income levels, not to
exceed 125% of the current HHS [Department of Health and Human Services] Federal Poverty
Income Guidelines .... ).
34. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation, The 2005 HHS Poverty Guidelines, available at http://aspe.hhs.
gov/poverty/05poverty.shtml. The rates are slightly higher for Alaska and Hawaii. Id.
35. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour
Division, Questions and Answers About the Minimum Wage, http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/q-
a.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2006). Basic state minimum wages range from $2.65 (Kansas) to
$7.63 (Washington); some states lack minimum-wage laws entirely. U.S. Department of Labor,
Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division, Minimum Wage Laws in the
States (Jan. 1, 2006), http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/america.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2006).
36. Sources vary on this number. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST
2005, supra note 11, at 6 (putting the number of eligible people at forty-three million); Luban,
supra note 11, at 211 (putting the number at forty-five million and citing to the 2000 U.S.
Census in support); U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty: Historical Poverty Tables, tbl. 6: People Below
125 Percent of Poverty Level and the Near Poor: 1959 to 2004, http://www.census
.gov/hheslwww/poverty/histpov/hstpov6.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2006) (putting the number in
2004 at almost fifty million--over seventeen percent of the country's population).
37. Hornstein et al., supra note 27, at 1090-91.
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Multiple surveys provide evidence that somewhere between
eighty and eighty-five percent of the poor have failed and continue to
fail to get the legal aid they need.38 The legal harms inflicted on and
by the low-income population are so disparate and acute, and the
resources available to combat them so insufficient, that some legal-
services lawyers have begun to approach their workload using a triage
model. This approach borrows from combat and emergency medicine
the idea that where limited resources meet insurmountable need, only
the most life-threatening cases receive treatment. 39 The disparity that
38. See, e.g., Brook K. Baker, Traditional Issues of Professional Responsibility and a
Transformative Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Discourse, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 809, 825
n.40 (2000) ('Numerous studies have shown that only [fifteen] to [twenty] percent of the nation's
poor receive legal services[,]' much of that provided by increasingly embattled legal[-]services
providers rather than by the private bar.") (quoting Ingrid V. Eagly, Community Education:
Creating a New Vision of Legal Services Practice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 433, 440 n.46 (1998)); Jill
Chaifetz, The Value of Public Service: A Model for Instilling a Pro Bono Ethic in Law School, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1697 (1993) (citing a recent study in support of the statement that "fewer
than 20 percent of poor people's legal needs are adequately addressed"); Laurie A. Morin,
Reflections on Teaching Law as Right Livelihood: Cultivating Ethics, Professionalism, and
Commitment to Public Service from the Inside Out, 35 TULSA L.J. 227, 238 n.53 (2000) (quoting
STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS' PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE REPORT SUPPORTING 1993 AMENDMENT TO RULE 6.1, reprinted in
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 308-09 (Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon,
Jr. eds., 1995)) (internal citation omitted):
The ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers' Public Service Responsibility, which
proposed the 1993 amendment to Rule 6.1, stated that "the inability of the poor to
obtain needed legal services has been well documented: Since 1983, when Rule 6.1
was adopted, at least one national and 13 state-wide studies assessing the legal needs
of the poor have been conducted. Of those studies reporting unmet legal need, there
has been a consistent finding that only about 15%-20% of the legal need[s] of the poor
are being addressed.
See also Deborah L. Rhode, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little
Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989, 992 (1998) (quoting Roger Abrams, Are There Too Many
Lawyers?, N.J. L.J., Feb. 13, 1995, at 23):
[T]he vast majority of legal needs among low[-]income households are unmet...
[Tihe problem for most Americans is not that there are too many lawyers, but rather
that "there are just too many lawyers trying to serve the same clients." Corporations
and individuals with deep pockets or large potential damage claims may encounter a
glut of would-be advocates. Ordinary Americans with ordinary needs do not.
See also Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Responsibilities of Professional Schools, 49 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 24, 26 (1999) [hereinafter Rhode, Professional Responsibilities] ("[A] nation with the
world's highest concentration of lawyers meets less than a quarter of the legal needs of its low-
income population."); Christina M. Rosas, Mandatory Pro Bono Publico for Law Students: The
Right Place to Start, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1069, 1074 (2002) ("The poor of this country suffer from
a severe lack of access to legal services.... Over eighty percent of this population's legal needs
are not adequately addressed. One estimate places this group's total number of hours of unmet
legal needs at twenty million annually." (citing Eldred & Schoenherr, supra note 26, at 372-73)).
39. See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 38, at 440:
Legal Services has become overwhelmed with demands for assistance. Case priorities
are usually set according to a "triage model," similar to the system in place in hospital
emergency rooms. Under this model, programs decide which types of cases to
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drives the triage model is on the radar of various high-profile legal
actors, including the ABA, 40 the National Legal Aid and Defenders
Association ("NLADA"),41 and the LSC itself.42 Indeed, thirty years
ago, Congress explicitly entrusted to the LSC the task of ensuring
equal access to justice for all. Unfortunately, in the intervening years,
legislative and regulatory forces have conspired to render this task
increasingly difficult, if not impossible.
B. The Storm Before the Storm: The Federal Government and the LSC
[The 1996 restrictions] hobble the ability of legal[-]services lawyers to address the
causes as well as symptoms of poverty. By expanding "access to justice" only on these
terms, legal assistance... foster[s] the illusion that "justice" has been done when
underlying problems remain unsolved.
4 3
Although the idea of legal services for the low-income
population of this country goes back to the urban legal-aid efforts that
undertake by using factors including degree of need, severity of poverty, and
likelihood of success.
See also Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro Bono Responsibilities: From
Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91, 94 (2002) ("Emergency triage
is the only practical option to manage the overwhelming demand."). See generally Paul
Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God" Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2475 (1999) (discussing the triage model and its implications).
40. ABA 2006 Budget Recommendations, supra note 27:
[Liocal LSC-funded legal aid programs throughout the country are forced to turn
away many thousands of individuals and families who need assistance with basic
legal problems. Various credible studies-state and national--continue to show that
despite the combined efforts of legal aid programs and private bar pro bono attorneys,
as many as 80% of the legal needs of people in poverty are not addressed in any way.
These are people who encounter legal problems relating to family relationships,
domestic violence, health, employment, housing and other basic life issues.
41. Memorandum from Lillian M. Moy, Chair, Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n [NLADA]
Civil Policy Group & Don Saunders, Director of Civil Legal Services, NLADA, to Helaine
Barnett, President, LSC, Recommendations for FY 2006 Mark (Aug. 16, 2004),
http://www.nlada.org/Civil/NLADA_News/2004092052167018 (last visited Apr. 30, 2006)
[hereinafter NLADA 2006 Budget Recommendations]:
During the time of federal retrenchment in funding since 1995, we have seen an
increase of 5.7% in the number of Americans living in poverty. Over 36 million people
qualify for services from your grantees. Yet, as the Board all too well knows, we as a
society remain able to address only about 20% of that need.
42. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST 2005, supra note 11, at 6 ("A sample of
recent legal needs studies performed on the state level demonstrate that there has been little or
no improvement since the ABA study was conducted"; for example, under twenty percent of low-
income people in Oregon, only fourteen percent in Massachusetts, and only twelve percent in
New Jersey are able to obtain help with their legal needs.).
43. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1797 (2001) [hereinafter
Rhode 2001].
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began in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,44 the origins of the
LSC lie in the poverty-law practice and political mood of the 1960s.
45
The LSC's predecessor program, the LSP, began in 1965 under the
auspices of the OEO and with the philosophical and structural support
of President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty. 46 Submitting to
Congress the bill that would become the LSC enabling act, President
Nixon recognized that "[t]he legal problems of the poor are of sufficient
scope that we should not restrict the right of their attorneys to bring
any type of civil suit" and prioritized "integrity of the adversary
process and full [protection of] the attorney-client relationship so
central to our judicial process."47 "At its peak outreach in 1980, LSC
received $300 million in federal funding, and was able to finance a
'minimum access' level of two lawyers for every 10,000 low-income
people within each service area throughout the country." 48 In 1999,
operating within a much lower budget and under even more confining
regulations, 49 "LSC grantees reported closing 1,038,662 million civil
44. See, e.g., Houseman 2003, supra note 9, at 5 (stating that "[c]ivil legal assistance for
poor people in the United States began in New York City in 1876"); Michelle S. Jacobs, Full
Legal Representation for the Poor: The Clash Between Lawyer Values and Client Worthiness, 44
How. L.J. 257, 287 (2001) [hereinafter Jacobs 2001] (noting that "[sihortly after the New York
Legal Aid Society was formed, similar efforts were undertaken in other areas of the country" and
that "[bly 1917, there were thirty-seven cities with forty-one different Legal Aid organizations").
45. The LSC's history has been told in detail numerous times in journal articles and books.
The sources cited here represent only a tiny sampling of the scholarship on the subject. For
overviews from different-and sometimes diametrically opposite-positions, see generally ALAN
W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL
LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES (2003), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/Legal-
Aid History.pdf; Eagly, supra note 38; Paula Galowitz, Restrictions on Lobbying by Legal
Services Attorneys: Redefining Professional Norms and Obligations, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39, 86-
87 (1994); Warren E. George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REV.
681 (1976); Hornstein et al., supra note 27, at 1091-1100; multiple sources by Alan Houseman,
including Houseman 2002, supra note 10, at 1213, 1217-21, and Alan W. Houseman, Political
Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor-A Commentary [on Marc Feldman's article of that name, 83
GEO. L.J. 1529 (1995)], 83 GEO. L.J. 1669, 1670-84 (1995) [hereinafter Houseman 1995]; Jacobs
2001, supra note 44; John McKay, Federally Funded Legal Services: A New Vision of Equal
Justice Under Law, 68 TENN. L. REV. 101 (2000); Quigley, supra note 5; Kelly Keenan
Trumpbour, Serving the Poor: The Need for Unification within Today's Legal Services, 2
MARGINS 63 (2002); Mauricio Vivero, From "Renegade" Agency to Institution of Justice: The
Transformation of Legal Services Corporation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1323 (2002).
46. Houseman 2002, supra note 10, at 1213.
47. Quigley, supra note 5, at 252 (quoting President's Message to Congress Proposing
Establishment of the Independent Corporation, 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 726, 729 (May 10,
1971)).
48. Eakeley, supra note 3, at 742.
49. In 1998, Congress passed a new set of restrictions that gave the LSC the power to
"foreclose recipients from future grants if they substantially violated the Legal Services
Corporation Act or appropriation provisions[J or if they sued LSC because of the restrictions,"
eliminated the right that had existed prior to that time whereby organizations denied LSC funds
could demand a hearing before an independent hearing officer and the LSC was precluded from
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legal cases relating to issues such as domestic violence, child custody
and visitation rights, evictions, access to health care, bankruptcy,
unemployment and disability claims, and many other issues."50  In
2002, a reduced number of LSC-funded legal-services organizations
and networks 51 closed "nearly one million civil legal cases."52  The
majority of these were resolved outside the courtroom "through advice,
referral[,] or brief services, maximizing the limited resources available
to serve the most clients."
53
Remarkably, however, the LSC has been under almost constant
attack since before Nixon signed it into law. Nixon's nominee for head
of the OEO in 1973 "had as his first order of business a plan to
dismantle the program."54  President Carter's administration
supported the LSC to such an extent that its funding more than
tripled, with a concomitant increase in program offerings. 55 But even
that degree of presidential favor was insufficient to push through a
reauthorization of the enabling act during Carter's tenure, and since
then the LSC has survived only year to year via budget
eliminating a challenging organization's funding until that hearing had been resolved, and
established a rule requiring grantees to reveal basic information about the participants in any
case they instituted. Alan W. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the Ethical Practice of
Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2187, 2190 (1999) [hereinafter Houseman 1999]. Although discussion
of these restrictions lies outside the scope of this Note, their potential constricting effect on the
already cramped provision of legal services seems clear.
50. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, LSC SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 1999
STATISTICS 1 (2000) [hereinafter LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION SPECIAL REPORT] (on file with
author). The LSC adjusted this number "by the average estimated error rate (11%) .... [for] a
total of cases closed for 1999 of 924,000." Id. at 7. The LSC defines a case as "the provision of
permissible legal assistance to an eligible client with a legal problem, or set of closely related
legal problems, accepted for assistance supported by LSC or non-LSC funds in accordance with
the requirements of the LSC Act, regulations, and other applicable law." Id. at 5.
51. In 1995, the LSC had 325 grantees. Houseman 2003, supra note 9, at 2. That year, in
partnership with national legal organizations including the NLADA, the ABA, the Center for
Law and Social Policy, and Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts ("IOLTA") programs, the LSC
reacted to Congress's one-third reduction of its funding by inaugurating a still-ongoing large-
scale effort to integrate state-level legal-services providers into more efficient, effective, and
streamlined service-provision networks "called state justice communities." Id. at 6-7. More than
350 legal-services offices were closed in the wake of the 1996 funding cuts. McMillion, supra note
3, at 118. The justice-community effort then ramped up significantly in 1998, after Congress
passed further restrictions on the LSC. Houseman 2003, supra note 9, at 7. In part as a result of
this initiative, by 2003, the LSC had 160 grantees. Id. at 2. See also Meredith McBurney, ABA
Center for Pro Bono, The Impact of Legal Services Program Reconfiguration on Pro Bono, at 1
(Apr. 2003), http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/impact-reconfiguration.pdf (last visited
Apr. 30, 2006).
52. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 3 (2003)
[hereinafter LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST 2004] (on file with author).
53. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST 2005, supra note 11, at 4.
54. Hornstein et al., supra note 27, at 1094.
55. Id. at 1095-96.
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appropriations. 56 Having lost a battle against federally funded legal
services during his tenure as governor of California, 57 President
Reagan made a concerted effort early in his first term to dissolve the
LSC entirely by appointing a board hostile to the very organization it
was intended to govern 58 and "drastically" decreasing the LSC's
funding.59 In the years since reaching its 1980 high-water mark, "the
LSC has been unable to obtain funding sufficient to maintain the level
of access achieved at that point and has lost considerable ground
because of... budget reductions.., and an inability to keep up with
inflation even with increased funding."60 "In real dollars, the [fiscal-
year 2002] appropriation amount[ed] to approximately half of the 1980
funding level"-and the fiscal-year 2005 appropriation amounted to
less than half of the funding level the following year.
61
The LSC came under renewed assault after a Republican
sweep of the November 1994 elections brought Newt Gingrich and his
Contract With America into power.6 2 On April 26, 1996, the 104th
Congress passed the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and
Appropriation Act of 1996 ("OCRAA").6 3 Via the OCRAA, Congress
rewarded governmental departments and agencies with varying




In 1970, Governor Reagan vetoed the California OEO grant [to California Rural Legal
Aid, or CRLA] on the stated grounds that legal[-]services funds had been diverted to
an activist political agenda far-distant from the original legislative intent .... An
investigatory commission of the OEO concluded that in fact routine legal matters
made up over 95% of the caseload of CRLA...
Quigley, supra note 5, at 249-50.
58. Houseman 1995, supra note 45, at 1687.
59. Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tending the Generous Heart: Mandatory Pro Bono and Moral
Development, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 460 n.3 (2001).
60. Houseman 2002, supra note 10, at 1221.
61. Larry R. Spain, The Unfinished Agenda for Law Schools in Nurturing a Commitment to
Pro Bono Legal Services by Law Students, 72 UMKC L. REV. 477, 478 n.l1 (2003) (citing to
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2000-2001 12 (2001)); LSC, JUSTICE GAP, supra
note 11, at 5.
62. Lawrence J. Fox, Legal Services and the Organized Bar: A Reminiscence and a Renewed
Call for Cooperation, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 305, 310 (1998); see also Hornstein et al., supra
note 27, at 1097 ("In June of 1995, twenty-eight members of Congress ... sent a letter to House
Speaker Newt Gingrich warning that 'there is every reason to believe that this agency will
threaten the reforms contained within the Republican "Contract with America.""') (internal
citation omitted).
63. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
64. For example, allocations to the Department of Justice included $16 million for the
Radiation Exposure Compensation Trust Fund and-for the now-engulfed Immigration and
Naturalization Service-a total of close to $1.4 billion, of which more than a third came
earmarked for the Border Patrol. § 101, 110 Stat. at 1321-1, 1321-7.
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Under Title V-Related Agencies, Congress awarded monies to such
little-known entities as the Commission for the Preservation of
America's Heritage Abroad, the Competitiveness Policy Council, and
the Ounce of Prevention Council. 65 Title V also reflected Congress's
allocation of $278 million to the LSC. 66 This allocation, however,
struck two significant blows at legal services.
First, in setting the LSC's allotment at $278 million, Congress
slashed its budget by forty percent. This effectively pushed the LSC's
funding back fifteen years, forcing the closing of more than a twelfth
of the nation's already insufficient legal-services offices and the
reduction in number of clients served by more than a million.67 The
number of open legal-services cases fell by 14.6 percent, with upwards
of 300,000 cases arrested, unfinished, by the sudden and drastic
reduction in funds.68
Second, Congress encumbered the allocation with yet another
lengthy set of administrative provisions restricting how the money
was to be spent "to carry out the purposes of the Legal Services
Corporation Act of 1974, as amended."69 The LSC then promulgated
regulations that instructed its grantees on compliance with the new
congressional restrictions. Under these restrictions, perhaps the
easiest way to indicate what LSC grantees may do for their clients is
to outline what they may not do. Since at least 1996, the LSC
regulations have proscribed legal-services lawyers from, among other
things:
o bringing or participating in class action suits, including filing
amicus briefs in support thereof;70
65. § 411, 110 Stat. at 1321-47, 1321-48, 1321-60.
66. § 501, 110 Stat. at 1321-50.
67. BRENNAN CENTER 2003, supra note 27, at 10. By contrast, consider the following
numbers: $61,656,965 (amount billed by Enron's bankruptcy lawyers in the first four months
after the company's collapse); more than one billion dollars ("the net operating income of only the
twenty largest firms in the District of Columbia in 2002"); thirty billion dollars ("the gross
national product of the legal profession in the United States"-in 1980). Hornstein et al., supra
note 27, at 1103-04.
68. Comms. on Civil Rights and Profl Responsibility, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York, A Call for the Repeal or Invalidation of Congressional Restrictions on Legal Services
Lawyers, 53 THE RECORD 13, 18 (1998) [hereinafter Committees on Civil Rights and Professional
Responsibility].
69. § 501, 110 Stat. at 1321-50. The 1996 restrictions were not the first to be levied, simply
the most stringent. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
70. LSC Rule on Class Actions, 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2006) ("Recipients are prohibited from
initiating or participating in any class action."); 45 C.F.R. § 1617.2(b)(1) ("Initiating or
participating in any class action means any involvement at any stage of a class action ...
'Involvement' includes acting as amicus curiae...").
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engaging in any of a wide variety of political activities,
including (although not limited to): (1) capitalizing on their
knowledge of poverty law and related issues by running for
a partisan office or supporting another candidate for such
an office; 71 (2) lobbying for a law or referendum favorable to
their clients or in opposition to one that works against their
clients' interests; 72 (3) registering their clients to vote or
providing them with transportation to the polls to exercise
that fundamental right;73 (4) or even training their clients to
engage in political activism on their own behalf;
74
" representing in a public-housing eviction procedure a person
accused or convicted of a drug-related offense;
75
* or participating in any civil litigation on behalf of prisoners,
even those incarcerated pre-trial.
76
Various arguments have been made against these restrictions.
One group focuses on constitutional concerns, particularly those
implicating the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. 77 This
71. LSC Prohibited Political Activities, 45 C.F.R. § 1608.5 (2006). Although a number of the
verboten activities enumerated in this paragraph have political elements, they can also be
characterized as legal: they concern the establishment, achievement, and protection of legal
rights through law-related means, from the development of fundamental concepts of those rights
to efforts to take advantage of them in environments in which doing so is otherwise difficult or
impossible. Moreover, the oft-touted separation between political and legal concerns is honored
more in the breach than not, given that laws and their regulatory analogues stand at the heart of
most political activity. Consider, say, the number of "political" rallies that concern actual or
proposed laws or legally binding regulations. Abortion, marriage equality, euthanasia and the
existence of a right to die, adoption, the separation of church and state-all are hot-button
political issues, and all implicate a wide variety of legal principles. The life of the mind
compartmentalizes far more neatly than does the everyday practical version.
72. LSC Restrictions on Lobbying and Certain Other Activities, 45 C.F.R. § 1612.3 (2006).
73. 45 C.F.R. § 1608.6.
74. 45 C.F.R. § 1612.8.
75. LSC Restriction on Representation in Certain Eviction Proceedings, 45 C.F.R. §§
1633.1-.3 (2006).
76. LSC Rule on Representation of Prisoners, 45 C.F.R. §§ 1637.1-.4 (2006). Like section
1633, this regulation appears to reflect biases against certain groups of people that are so strong
as to trump the fundamental presumption that an accused person is innocent until proven guilty.
77. See, e.g., Committees on Civil Rights and Professional Responsibility, supra note 68, at
32-33:
The reach of the government's restraint... amounts to an outright ban on
conventional lawyering activities by lawyers for the poor-barring attorneys who
work for offices that receive even modest support from the LSC from using non-LSC
funds for lawyering activities that the federal government has chosen not to
support.... Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, [this bar] is plainly
inconsistent with the First Amendment.
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argument holds that "[bly conditioning LSC funding on the surrender
of such rights as the right to file a lawsuit and the right to engage in
advocacy, the restrictions implicate the First Amendment."78 Another
set of objections focuses on administrative and financial issues. For
example, the purpose provision of the regulation on "program
integrity" indicates that the regulation
is designed to implement statutory restrictions on the use of non-LSC funds by LSC
recipients and to ensure that no LSC-funded entity shall engage in any restricted
activities and that recipients maintain objective integrity and independence from
organizations that engage in restricted activities.
7 9
The prohibition provision of that regulation then explicitly bars LSC
grantees from taking any action forbidden elsewhere in the LSC
regulations-not only with LSC funds, but with any funds received
from non-LSC sources as well.80 This regulation has been interpreted
to require LSC grantees that want to engage in forbidden activities to
establish an entirely separate physical facility for that purpose-a
difficult proposition for already understaffed, underfunded legal-
services organizations.81
The 1996 restrictions also included a requirement that the LSC
immediately implement a competitive grant-awarding process under
which "[n]o person or entity that was previously awarded a grant or
contract by the Legal Services Corporation for the provision of legal
assistance [could] be given any preference in the competitive selection
process."8 2  By removing any certainty that a given organization's
funding will continue from year to year, this provision threatens the
78. Harvard Law Review, Constitutional Law--Congress Imposes Restrictions on Use of
Funds by the Legal Services Corporation: Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1346, 1347 (1997).
79. LSC Rule on Use of Non-LSC Funds, Transfer of LSC Funds, Program Integrity, 45
C.F.R. § 1610.1 (2006).
80. 45 C.F.R. § 1610.3.
81. See, e.g., Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, Federal Judge Strikes Down
Discriminatory Restrictions on Lawyers for the Poor (Dec. 20, 2004), http://www.brennancenter.
org/presscenter/releases_2004/pressrelease_2004_1220.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2006):
The only way for a legal aid office to use private money to bring these restricted cases
was to establish a physically separate facility. Complying with this "physical
separation requirement" is so expensive that virtually none of the approximately 140
LSC grantees around the country-which are already so cash-strapped that they can
only represent a small fraction of eligible clients-have been able to meet it. For
example, ... South Brooklyn Legal Services would have to turn away 500 more people
each year if it set up a separate office.
In December 2004, a New York federal judge found the program-integrity requirement
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. Dobbins v. Legal Services Corp., companion case
to Velasquez v. Legal Services Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). See infra note 205
and accompanying text for a discussion of the follow-up to this decision.
82. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 (1996).
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stability of grantees' ongoing work and the integrity of their service to
their clients.8 3 These arguments and others have been advanced in
court cases challenging the 1996 restrictions on a variety of grounds;
to date, however, such challenges have met with, at best, limited
success.
8 4
III. SHORTFALLS AND STRATEGIES: ETHICAL REPRESENTATION UNDER
THE ACT
The legal profession expects a great deal of itself. To get a
sense of the nature of these expectations, one need only consider the
preamble to the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. This
important statement on legal professionalism makes clear that
lawyers serve the public interest and "play a vital role in the
preservation of society" and that equal access to justice should be a
goal, not just for poverty lawyers, but for all members of the
profession.8 5 Other discussions of professionalism, the broad-based
behavioral rubric under which lawyers operate, invoke similar
concepts. In restricting legal services, the LSC Act and concomitant
regulations conflict with not only the goal of equal access to justice,
but also significant mores of professional legal conduct. These
conflicts affect all lawyers, both public and private, who provide legal
services to the income-eligible.
83. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 4, at 777:
Being able to stay put and to dedicate resources over timef is the greatest
contribution that a program can make to the practice of long-haul lawyering. Long
before Congress stripped Legal Services offices of most of the weapons in their
arsenals for systemic strategies, consultants reminded them that their greatest
strength lay in "being there": on the "collective institutional memory" of the
neighborhood law office, a repository of impressions filtered through individual cases
that build insight about neighborhood problems.
Cf. Kenneth F. Boehm, The Legal Services Program: Unaccountable, Political, Anti-Poor, Beyond
Reform and Unnecessary, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 321, 323 (1998), applying a free-market
competitive model to legal services with no apparent understanding either of the value of
continuity of service or of the idea that legal-services lawyers might have non-financial motives
for providing their clients with the best possible representation:
The prevailing practice within the program of "presumptive refunding" has meant
that once a local group has become a grantee, it will typically get automatic renewals
of that grant in perpetuity. There is little incentive to provide excellent legal services
because the grant is renewed regardless of whether the group has done a good, poor or
mediocre job. The size of the grant is calculated based on the poverty population of the
service area, not the quality of service.
84. For a discussion of constitutional arguments against the 1996 restrictions and details of
some of the first cases to bring such challenges (including the early stages of what became
Velasquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 529 U.S. 1052 (2000), and Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal
Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1998)), see Roth, supra note 6.
85. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (2004),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc-toc.html [hereinafter ABA 2004].
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A. The Premises of Professionalism
The responsibility of the lawyer to exercise professional responsibility, thereby
maintaining the efficient and just functioning of the legal system, is a theme often
repeated in discussions of professionalism.
86
Of all the concepts bandied about in legal scholarship,
professionalism is one of the most inchoately defined and widely
debated.8 7 The terms "professionalism," "professional responsibility,"
"professional conduct," and even "ethics" or "legal ethics" are often
used interchangeably.8 8 Articles on the legal world's "professionalism
crisis" abound, sometimes with a notable lacuna where a definition of
the central term might logically be.8 9  Published conceptions of
professionalism involve a wide variety of components that are
occasionally contradictory 90 and often intertwined. These include, but
are not limited to,91 concepts such as the following: equality,
86. Michelle S. Jacobs, Legal Professionalism: Do Ethical Rules Require Zealous
Representation for Poor People?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 97, 104 (1995) [hereinafter Jacobs 1995].
87. An earlier version of this paragraph was written by the author for a paper entitled
"When and How They Enter: Law Students, Public-Interest Law, and What We Don't (Yet)
Know" and submitted in fall 2004 to Vanderbilt University Law School's Law & Poverty
Seminar.
88. See, e.g., CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
PROFESSIONALISM CODES, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/profcodes.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2006)
(listing state-level codes, the titles of which include words such as "professionalism," "civility,"
"appropriate conduct," "courtesy" and "professional courtesy," "professional conduct,"
"professional responsibility," "ethics," and even "client rights and responsibilities").
89. On the professionalism crisis, see Morin, supra note 38, at 237-38 nn.46-51 (citing an
American Bar Association report and multiple books and articles on the subject). For an example
of a definitional lacuna, see Bruce A. Green, Public Declarations of Professionalism, 52 S.C. L.
REV. 729, 733 (2001) (suggesting that debate over the precise meaning of the term be abandoned,
on the ground that "[e]ven if lawyers have different understandings of what it means to be
'professional,' almost all understand the importance of being 'professional").
90. See, e.g., Melissa L. Breger et al., Teaching Professionalism in Context: Insights from
Students, Clients, Adversaries, and Judges, 55 S.C. L. REV. 303, 305 (2003) ("[T]here is
substantial debate over standards of professionalism beyond the mandatory rules. What may
seem like civility to one lawyer may seem like a breach of the ethical duty of zealous advocacy to
another.").
91. Complementary definitions of professionalism abound. A sampling:
* "pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service-no
less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood"
(American Bar Association, Commission on Professionalism, ".. .In the Spirit of
Public Service" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112
F.R.D. 243, 261 (1986) [hereinafter ABA 1986]).
* doing the best possible job of representation (Green, supra note 89, at 736).
* honesty and truthfulness (see, e.g., Green, supra note 89, at 736 ("[A]
professionalism code might state simply: . .. 'We will be honest and keep our
word."'); Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM & MARY L.
REV. 283, 304 (1998) (describing honesty as an element of professionalism)).
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autonomy, and community, all incorporating an element of balance
between the client's interests and those of the lawyer;92 competence,
diligence and promptness, preserving the rule of law, serving the
profession, and ensuring access to the courts;93 justice, fairness, and
morality;94 zeal and zealous advocacy;
95 and ethics.9 6
an obligation to perform public service (see, e.g., James L. Baillie & Judith
Bernstein-Baker, In the Spirit of Public Service: Model Rule 6.1, The Profession
and Legal Education, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 51, 65 (1994) ("[T]he public service
obligation of lawyers is an inherent characteristic, or defining element, of the
profession. If there is no larger calling to public service, then the practice of law
is simply a trade, consisting of a collection of analytical skills honed for
commercial success."). Green calls this component "assistance to the
underserved." Green, supra note 89, at 736.
* "a way for people to participate in a meaningful fashion in the resolution of their
social disputes or in prevention of social disputes or both" (Jacobs 1995, supra
note 86, at 107-08 (quoting JACK SAMMONS, LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM, 5-6
(1988))).
* "a genuine interest in preserving the rights of the many against the power of the
few" (Kara Anne Nagorney, A Noble Profession? A Discussion of Civility Among
Lawyers, 12 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 815, 827 (1999)).
* "those goals, values, and attitudes which exemplify the nobler aspects of the
practice of law and that enhance the public image of lawyers and the legal
profession" (Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical
Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV.
1337, 1343 (1997)).
92. Richard L. Abel, Taking Professionalism Seriously, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 41, 43.
Other scholars also list autonomy as a component of professionalism. See, e.g., Jacobs 1995,
supra note 86, at 104 (arguing that defining "autonomy" as control over one's own work creates a
damaging distance between lawyers and their clients). Another scholar includes client-
centeredness under a nominally different rubric, that of representational ethics. Baker, supra
note 38, at 841.
93. Baker, supra note 38, at 812. Baker categorizes all of these components under the
general rubric of "ethical issues." Id. He derives them from several sources, including: AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1999); AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983); AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM (Robert MacCrate ed. 1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report]; and SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF
LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS (1996). Id. at 819-25. Other scholars also list competence
as a component of professionalism. See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A.
Joy, Clinical Education for the Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 13 (2000);
Breger et al., supra note 90, at 335.
94. See, e.g., Beverly Balos, The Bounds of Professionalism: Challenging Our Students;
Challenging Ourselves, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 129, 145 (1997); Barry et al., supra note 93, at 13, 55
("[Cilinical education [has a] longstanding commitment to social justice and the inculcation of the
professional values of access to justice, fairness, and non-discrimination in the legal system.").
Like Baker, supra note 38, Balos derives these components from the values section of the
MacCrate Report, supra note 93. Balos, supra, at 145.
95. See, e.g., Breger et al., supra note 90, at 335; Nagorney, supra note 91, at 817
("[P]rofessionalism and zealous advocacy are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it could be
considered a mark of professionalism for a lawyer to firmly protect and pursue the legitimate
interests of his or her client.") (internal citations omitted).
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This overview suggests that the concept of "professionalism"
has something of an "I know it when I see it" quality. Nonetheless,
certain overarching themes are relatively clear. Ideas/ideals of ethics
provide a recurrent refrain, incorporating values such as public
service, equality of representation and access, high-quality
representation, autonomy, and justice. These ethical concepts do not
arise solely from legal scholarship; the ABA advocates them as well.
When the ABA commissioned a study on legal education and
professional development in the early 1990s, the resulting report
included "provision of competent representation" and "striving to
promote justice, fairness, and morality" in a list of only four values
that all lawyers should possess.97 Correspondingly, the Model Rules
and the comments thereon support professional goals of, among other
things, competent representation, zealous advocacy, and pro bono
work.98
Both the ABA and courts have made clear that these standards
apply to legal-services lawyers just as they do to members of the
private bar.99 In 1986, the ABA updated its "[s]tandards for the
operation of civil legal aid programs," which had been in operation
since 1961 and had not been reviewed since before the creation of the
LSC in 1974.100 The introduction to this update specifies the degree to
which legal-services lawyers remain affected by the Model Rules even
within their constrained professional context:
These Standards do not impose any different ethical requirements than those already
contained in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of
96. See, e.g., Rhode, Professional Responsibilities, supra note 38, at 28; Breger et al., supra
note 90, at 305 ("[W]e agree that professionalism embraces the realm of ethics, but also reaches
far beyond .... [E]thical rules provide a minimum level of professionalism .... ").
97. Jacobs 2001, supra note 44, at 260 (quoting the MacCrate Report, supra note 93, at
140-41).
98. ABA 2004, supra note 85, R. 1.1, 5.4(c), and 6.1 (2004). These rules are discussed in
more detail infra at notes 110-128 and 165-169 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 503 (2001) ("[1]t has long been held that the same ethical
standards apply to lawyers working in legal[-]services programs as to lawyers in law firms.")
(citing, inter alia, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Opinion 324 (1970)
(legal-services lawyers have a "primary obligation of loyalty' to their clients and are required 'to
act in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility") and Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d
89, 92-93 (D.C. 1971) ("We are reluctant ever to make an exception from the professional norm
for attorneys ... who provide legal representation without compensation from the client because
then we might encourage a misapprehension that the special nature of such representation
justifies departure from the profession's standards.")).
100. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS (SCLAID),
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Professional Conduct. In some instances, they touch upon issues that are governed by
the accepted rules of professional conduct, and elucidate their application in the context
of the special circumstances of providing civil legal services to indigents. In those
instances the commentary may make appropriate reference to, but does not alter, the
controlling ethical requirement. 101
B. The Public Providers: Performance Under Pressures
The practice of law in the spirit of public service can and should be a hallmark of the
profession. 102
In light of these professional expectations, the congressional
restrictions on the LSC and the resulting regulatory restrictions on
the LSC's grantees create an untenably self-contradictory situation for
many legal-services lawyers by preventing them from effectively
serving those whom they are mandated to serve. Evidence of this
Gordian knot appears in the very act authorizing the LSC, which
provides that
[t]he Corporation shall not, under any provision of this title, interfere with any attorney
in carrying out his professional responsibilities to his client as established in the Canons
of Ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association
(referred to collectively in this title as "professional responsibilities") or abrogate as to
attorneys in programs assisted under this title the authority of a State or other
jurisdiction to enforce the standards of professional responsibility generally applicable
to attorneys in such jurisdiction. 103
With this mandate, the Act clearly reflects an expectation that legal-
services lawyers will comply with the ethical guidelines governing
their profession as a whole. Thus, on the understanding of
professionalism articulated above, they will work for equal access to
justice. Indeed, Congress explicitly spells out this expectation in the
"statement of findings and Declaration of purpose" that opens the Act:
"[Tihere is a need to provide equal access to the system of justice in
our Nation ... [P]roviding legal assistance to those who face an
economic barrier to adequate legal counsel will serve best the ends of
justice . ."."104
101. Id. at 3. In 2004, the ABA formed a task force for the purpose of updating the standards
to accommodate the changes in the provision of legal services in the intervening eighteen years.
The task force intended to present its revisions to the ABA House of Delegates in February 2006.
ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Task Force to Revise ABA
Standards for Providers of Civil Legal Services to the Poor (2004), http://www.abanet.
orgllegalservices/downloads/sclaid/standards/revisionprojectoverview.pdf (last visited Apr. 30,
2006).
102. ABA 1986, supra note 91, at 261.
103. LSC Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(3) (2006).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2996.
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1. Congressional and Regulatory Restrictions
Contrary to this clear statement of purpose, the 1996
amendments to the Act and the ensuing regulations repeatedly
undercut Congress's expressed goal of equal access to justice. The
enacting bill insists that "attorneys providing legal assistance must
have full freedom to protect the best interests of their clients in
keeping with the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Ethics, and the high standards of the legal profession."'10 5 The Act re-
emphasizes this point in no uncertain terms only a few provisions
later when it states that
[w]ith respect to grants or contracts in connection with the provision of legal assistance
to eligible clients under this subchapter, the [LSC] shall.., insure the maintenance of
the highest quality of service and professional standards, the preservation of attorney-
client relationships, and the protection of the integrity of the adversary [sic] process
from any impairment in furnishing legal assistance to eligible clients.
10 6
These requirements seem incompatible, however, with the
impediments Congress has placed in the path of any lawyer
attempting to meet them, via the laundry list above of options,
opportunities, choices, and tactics foreclosed by law to legal-services
lawyers.' 0 7 The fact that the tools on this list remain generally
available to other lawyers strengthens the argument that, held to a
professional standard that specifies "the highest quality of service,"
legal-services lawyers must attempt to meet that standard with fewer
and weaker options than those available to the private bar. Given the
handicap these restrictions present, one might wonder whether such
assistance remains possible-and how realistic the goal of equal
access to justice can be if it is not.
The LSC regulations promulgated in the wake of the 1996
restrictions both echo and undercut the Act's aims. For example, the
purpose section of the regulation regarding prohibited political
activities specifies that "[t]his part is designed to insure that the
Corporation's resources will be used to provide high quality legal
assistance" and that "[t]he part should be construed and applied so as
to further this purpose without infringing upon the constitutional
rights of employees or the professional responsibilities of attorneys to
105. Id.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(1) (2006). A past chair of the LSC echoes this foundational goal: "As
part of its role in providing a national foundation for the delivery of legal services to low-income
people, LSC has a responsibility to ensure that the delivery system provides throughout the
country cost-effective assistance that meets the highest standards of thoroughness, quality, and
professionalism." Eakeley, supra note 3, at 744-45.
107. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59:3:971992
FEDERALLY FUNDED LEGAL SERVICES
their clients."108 The regulations outlining the requirements for LSC
grantees' governing bodies and restricting lobbying and training,
however, imply that the standard of service for low-income clients
need merely be "adequate."10 9  One subsection of the lobbying
regulation juxtaposes its invocation of this standard of service with
language prohibiting legal-services lawyers from training clients to
organize on their own behalf, or even conducting training sessions
that "advocate particular policies"-presumably policies beneficial to
those clients. Taken together, these provisions imply that shutting
legal-services lawyers out of organized political action will not lower
the quality of the legal assistance they provide to their clients. Given
the protest-heavy, highly politicized atmosphere of today's world, this
seems somewhat improbable.
2. Regulations Versus Rules
The 1996 restrictions also present legal-services lawyers with
interconnected ethical problems. These problems lie at the nexus of
the restrictions, which govern legal-services lawyers' workplaces and
the specifics of their work, and the Model Rules, which establish the
ethical guidelines according to which lawyers should conduct their
work. The conflict is clear from the outset of the rules. Rule 1.1 sets
out the first responsibility of a lawyer to her clients: "A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."' 10  The
Comment on Rule 1.1 amplifies this point: "Competent handling of a
particular matter includes ... use of methods and procedures meeting
the standards of competent practitioners." '' Considered in light of
that overarching directive, the 1996 restrictions and their concomitant
LSC regulations would seem to prevent, or at least to hinder, legal-
services lawyers from meeting even their profession's threshold goal of
competent representation.
108. LSC Prohibited Political Activities, 45 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (2006) (emphasis added).
109. LSC Governing Bodies, 45 C.F.R. § 1607.1 (2006) ("This part is designed to insure that
the governing body of a recipient will be well qualified to guide a recipient in its efforts to provide
high-quality legal assistance to those who otherwise would be unable to obtain adequate legal
counsel...") (emphasis added); LSC Restrictions on Lobbying and Certain Other Activities, 45
C.F.R. § 1612.8 ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit training of any [persons]
involved in the representation of eligible clients necessary for preparing them: (1) to provide
adequate legal assistance to eligible clients or (2) [t]o provide advice to any eligible client as to
the legal rights of the client.") (emphasis added).
110. ABA 2004, supra note 85.
111. Id.
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For example, one LSC regulation 12 flatly forbids legal-services
lawyers from either bringing or participating in class action suits." 3
Although a version of this restriction has existed since the LSC's
creation in 1974, the original version differed from the 1996 restriction
in one vital way: until 1996, legal-services lawyers could bring or
become involved with class action suits "where necessary to provide
appropriate client representation" if the grantee organization for
which they worked approved the action.114 On promulgation of this
regulation, however, many LSC grantees had to abandon ongoing
class action suits, sometimes ending the case without resolution for
those seeking help. 115 Since the option of bringing or participating in
a class action is a tactic readily available to general practitioners,
denying it to one particular group of lawyers may directly affect that
group's ability to fulfill the competency requirement of the Model
Rules. The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
recognized this more than ten years ago when it established that it is
"unethical to limit an attorney's ability to file a class action lawsuit
when such relief [is] essential for the attorney's client."116 In addition,
112. This section comes directly from the 1996 OCRAA restrictions. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321, 1321-53 (1996) ("None of the funds appropriated in this Act to the Legal Services
Corporation may be used to provide financial assistance to any person or entity (which may be
referred to in this section as a 'recipient') ... (7) that initiates or participates in a class action
suit").
113. LSC Rule on Class Actions, 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2006) ("Recipients are prohibited from
initiating or participating in any class action."). Class actions are not a cure-all for the maladies
of poverty and deprivation, any more than is any other legal tactic. They do, however, offer the
advantage of efficiency. Given appropriate client consent, a legal-services lawyer to whom the
class-action tool was available could, for example, bring suit against a low-income-housing
landlord/property owner on behalf of multiple clients deleteriously affected by the landlord's
habit of failing to make major structural repairs to floors and ceilings damaged by weather and
age. Contrast this with the current system, under which the same lawyer representing the same
clients must bring multiple separate suits against the same landlord over the same issue. From a
practical perspective, this system necessarily expends scarce legal-services funds and loads court
dockets with repetitive litigation. At a minimum, the ethical concerns articulated elsewhere in
this Note suggest that the class-action tool should be available to legal-services lawyers and their
clientele, thereby rendering the substantive effect of that availability susceptible of judgment
over some reasonable length of time. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
114. Committees on Civil Rights and Professional Responsibility, supra note 68, at 22.
115. See, e.g., BRENNAN CENTER, LEFT OUT IN THE COLD: How CLIENTS ARE AFFECTED BY
RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR LEGAL SERVICES LAWYERS 6-7 (2000), available at http://www.
brennancenter.org/resources/atj/atj6.pdf [hereinafter BRENNAN CENTER 2000] (describing a
California deadbeat-dad child-support class action turned over abruptly to a private firm and a
Louisiana class action regarding disability benefits that found no new counsel). When the 1996
restrictions took effect, the California firm (which was comprised of former legal-services
lawyers) inherited thirty class actions from its local legal aid office. Id. at 13.
116. Ilisabeth Smith Bornstein, Comment, From the Viewpoint of the Poor: An Analysis of the
Constitutionality of the Restriction on Class Action Involvement by Legal Services Attorneys, 2003
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 693, 715-16 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op.
334(1995)).
994
FEDERALLY FUNDED LEGAL SERVICES
there is a practical consideration: in forbidding legal-services lawyers
from bringing class actions on behalf of their clientele, Congress
removed from their hands a tool uniquely designed to assist that
clientele in extricating themselves from poverty. 117  This socially
desirable end is also economically desirable.118 After all, the smaller
the population of income-eligible poor, the less money legal services
might require and the more money Congress could therefore allocate
elsewhere.
The restrictions may also put legal-services lawyers in conflict
with the Rules with regard to informed client consent. According to
Rule 1.0(e), "[i]nformed consent denotes the agreement by a person to
a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and
reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.""19
The Rules require lawyers to obtain clients' informed consent in
several circumstances, including in any situation in which the scope of
representation is to be limited 20 by, for example, the "terms under
which the lawyer's services are made available to the client."' 21 This
mandate puts the legal-services lawyer, whose representation is
restricted from the outset by the restrictions discussed herein, on the
horns of a significant ethical dilemma: whether an income-eligible
client's consent can be viewed as genuinely meaningful when the
agreement she signs may represent her only hope of help. Relatedly,
117. BRENNAN CENTER 2000, supra note 115, at 7 ("And while class actions and other now-
banned activities sometimes enabled legal[-]services lawyers to attack systemic problems and
achieve sweeping solutions, the results were not abstract philosophical victories. Instead, the
restricted activities helped people deal with serious problems and made their lives better in
concrete ways."). Although the ABA legal-services standards do not discuss class-action suits
specifically, their governing principles do seem to imply a conflict between the LSC's rendering
verboten certain law-reform activities (of which lobbying and political advocacy join class actions
as examples) and the ABA's expectation of the lawyers from whom such activities are foreclosed:
When effective resolution of individual clients' problems is circumscribed by existing
laws and practices, or when existing laws and practices result in the same or similar
problems for many indigent clients, representation of a client may call for a
practitioner to reach beyond the individual problem to challenge the law, policy or
practice. The fact that such advocacy may be complex, difficult, or controversial
should not be a barrier to a practitioner pursuing it.
ABA, STANDARDS, supra note 100, at 4 (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., Jacobs 2001, supra note 44, at 299:
Resolution of economic deprivation of the poor would benefit everyone because it
would reduce the drain on the costs of social services to the poor and the costs of
securing everyone against crime committed by the poor.... More gainfully employed
workers mean more disposable income to pump into local economies. More incomes
mean better services and living conditions, which translate into safer communities.
119. ABA 2004, supra note 85, R. 1.0(e).
120. Id. R. 1.2(c).
121. Id. R. 1.2(c) cmt. [6].
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[t]he restrictions on legal[-]services attorneys [also] erode the informed client's right of
choice by obstructing the client's... ability to command as many options for the
resolution of the case as possible .... The restrictions prevent the client from being
heard ... because they deprive the client of any opportunity to argue that a particular
case should be accepted, or that a particular strategy should be employed. 122
3. Ethical Tensions: The Big Picture
The conflict outlined above between restrictions, regulations,
and rules informs two large-scale ethical issues facing legal-services
lawyers. The first concerns the central professional value of
autonomy, particularly the components thereof regarding the exercise
of independent professional judgment and the need to prevent third
parties from controlling one's work.1 23 The Model Rules highlight this
central value, mandating that "[a] lawyer shall not permit a person
who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services
for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in
rendering such legal services. ' 124 The Rules also specify that "[a]
lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from
one other than the client unless ... (2) there is no interference with
the lawyer's independence of professional judgment .... -125
The second arises with regard to the professional expectation of
zealous advocacy. 126 This expectation derives from the Comments on
Model Rule 1.3, which make clear that "[a] lawyer must.., act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal
in advocacy upon the client's behalf."127 Under the 1996 restrictions,
122. Galowitz, supra note 45, at 92-93.
123. Ethics Panel, supra note 4, at 370; see also Committees on Civil Rights and Professional
Responsibility, supra note 68, at 18 ('The Budget Act impermissibly interferes with the
independent lawyer-client relation by, among other things, restricting the autonomy and
professional judgment of lawyers who work for LSC-funded organizations.").
124. ABA 2004, supra note 85, R. 5.4(c).
125. Id. R. 1.8(f).
126. Ethics Panel, supra note 4, at 369.
127. ABA 2004, supra note 85, R. 1.3 cmt. [1]. As one reviewer of this note pointed out, the
language of zealous advocacy has been removed from the '%lack-letter" Rules themselves and
relegated to the comments thereon, which are informative at best and do not carry the force of
the regulations from which they depend. Id. (I am indebted to Professor Susan Kay for this
point.). Even a cursory search on LexisNexis, however, reveals that the concept of zealous
advocacy still occupies a significant place in matters concerning legal ethics and professional
goals. See, e.g., Colloquium, Zealous Advocacy In a Time of Uncertainty: Understanding Lawyers'
Ethics, 8 D.C. L. REV. 219, 221 (2004). A similar search on the ABA's website leads the searcher
to a similar conclusion. Whatever the Rules say (or do not say) about zeal in advocacy, the
discussion thereof is alive and well. Moreover, the standards laid out by the ABA specifically for
legal-services lawyers explicitly articulate the "zealous representation of client interests" as one
of the four fundamental principles underlying those standards. ABA, STANDARDS, supra note
100, at 4.
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legal-services lawyers must endeavor to meet this standard hampered
by all of the limits outlined thus far. These restrictions and the
concomitant LSC regulations both prevent legal-services lawyers from
serving otherwise eligible clients and cabin their ability to assist those
clients whom they are permitted to represent by limiting the methods
and means they may use. Thus, truly autonomous advocacy is
inherently off-limits to legal-services lawyers. Moreover, the very
nature of legal representation means that legal-services lawyers
cannot always tell at the outset of a case what tactics they will want
or need to use in resolving that case to their client's benefit--or what
changes may occur in a client's life over the course of the case.'
28
Under the 1996 restrictions and subsequent regulations, such
uncertainty confronts legal-services lawyers with the reality that they
may be forced to terminate their aid to a client without notice and
without much, if any, expectation that the client will be able to get
help elsewhere. This ethical bind is virtually untenable, and yet, as
the restrictions stand, it seems unavoidable.
By definition, the ethical concerns specific to legal-services
work do not typically affect private lawyers. Thus, one might imagine
that the best way to avoid the ethical tangles outlined above would be
to turn over to the private bar any person in need of assistance that
the public bar may not, under current law, provide. Unfortunately,
this theoretically elegant solution runs afoul of certain private-bar
norms. Private lawyers are subject to their own set of ethical
pressures with regard to the legal needs of low-income people as they
arise in the complicated area of pro bono work. Combined with the
profession's general reluctance to engage in any substantial amount of
such work, these pressures raise a significant barrier to the effective
sharing of responsibility for low-income legal assistance.
C. The Private Bar: Pro Bono and Its Problematic Potential
Nowhere is the gap between professional ideals and professional practice more apparent
than on issues of pro bono responsibility.
1 2 9
Although supporters of the cuts and restrictions said that state, local and private
funding would pick up the slack [in legal-services funding], and although bar leaders
and legal aid supporters find broad support for legal services in many parts of the
country, the bottom line is that these expectations have been largely unfulfilled.
1 3 0
128. Ethics Panel, supra note 4, at 375.
129. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 25, at 2415.
130. BRENNAN CENTER 2003, supra note 27, at 4.
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1. Pro Bono: Who and Why
The ABA has established a substantive pro bono goal for U.S.
lawyers:
A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per
year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: (a) provide a substantial
majority of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to: (1)
persons of limited means or (2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental
and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the
needs of persons of limited means; and (b) provide any additional services through: (1)
delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or
organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or
charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in
matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard
legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be
otherwise inappropriate; (2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to
persons of limited means; or (3) participation in activities for improving the law, the
legal system or the legal profession. In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute
financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited
means. 131
On its face, this seems to be a reasonable goal. Fifty hours of pro bono
work per year per lawyer averages out to approximately an hour a
week, or less than thirteen minutes a day. Moreover, as discussed
above, 132 the ethics of legal professionalism place a high value on
service to the public, as well as on the access-to-justice aspect of
lawyers' fundamental role as officers of the court. Pro bono work
appears to fit into both categories. Indeed, the general professional
discourse on pro bono boasts a number of arguments supporting such
work. These include but are not limited to the following ideas:
" that an obvious and unmet need for legal services exists;133
" that lawyers, given a monopoly on a large body of important
knowledge, owe it to their fellow citizens to operate within
the confines of that monopoly in a way that benefits
society-to "share the wealth," as it were; 134
131. ABA 2004, supra note 85, R. 6.1.
132. See supra Part III.A.
133. See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Eldred & Schoenherr, supra note 26, generally and at 395 (internal citations
omitted):
It is an obvious fact ... that all of our legal institutions (except small claims court) are
designed to be operated by lawyers and not by laypersons. Laws are written in such a
way that they can be interpreted only by lawyers; judicial decisions are crafted so as
to be fully intelligible only to the legally trained. Court regulations, court schedules,
even courthouse architecture are designed around the needs of the legal
profession.... As a result, meaningful access to the legal system unavoidably requires
the services of competent counsel.
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* that "a duty of service is one strand of the lawyer's role as
officer of the court and therefore expected of every lawyer,"
arising from the history and tradition of lawyering and
tacitly assumed when one enters the field;
3 5
" that service may be conceived of as "discharg[ing] a debt
owed for the privilege of licensure, the so-called quid pro quo
approach";
3 6
* "that special abilities sometimes confer moral obligations"; 137
" that service to others benefits lawyers themselves in a
variety of ways, including "increas[ing their] empathy and
expand[ing] their perspectives," improving their grasp of
practical legal skills, and conferring on them "the
experience of personal reward associated with professional
generosity";
138
" and that pro bono work will improve lawyers' public image. 13
9
Some evidence exists that many members of the private bar do
strive to live up to the ABA's aspirational pro-bono standard. A 2005
study conducted by the ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and
Public Service reports that sixty-six percent of the 1,100 attorneys
surveyed had provided at least some free legal services to "persons of
limited means or organizations serving the poor" in the previous
year.140 Moreover, of the attorneys offering any kind of pro bono
services as defined in Rule 6.1, forty-six percent had "provided 50 or
more hours" thereof. 4 1 Although these numbers derive from a very
small sample and reflect attorney self-reporting rather than reporting
135. Loder, supra note 59, at 463.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 463-64.
139. Id. at 464.
140. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV., SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A REPORT
ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA'S LAWYERS 11, 13 (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.orglegalservices/probono/report.pdf [hereinafter ABA, SUPPORTING JUSTICE];
ABA 2004, supra note 85, R. 6.1(a). The Standing Committee's pro bono reports paint a
strikingly different picture from that outlined in most prior research. See, e.g., sources cited infra
note 143. Statistically speaking, however, it is not yet clear whether that picture is likely to be
truly representative, particularly given that, as of this writing, the data is too new to have been
corroborated.
141. ABA, SUPPORTING JUSTICE, supra note 140, at 13.
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of a more formal type, 142 they do appear to represent an improvement
over pro bono figures from the recent past.' 43
2. Programmatic Problems
When viewed from the perspective of the pro bono programs
themselves, however, the pro bono picture becomes somewhat more
troubling. An LSC study of the Private Attorney Involvement ("PAI")
pro bono programs mandated by LSC regulations found that between
1997 and 1998 the number of cases closed under such programs fell by
13.33 percent, while the number of private-bar lawyers working
therein fell by 6.38 percent. 144 In 2003, of approximately 150,000
lawyers "registered to participate in" such programs, only 45,000 were
actually doing so to any degree. 145 According to the ABA, there were
1,104,766 active lawyers in the United States in 2005.146 Assuming
that the number of PAI-active private-bar lawyers remained
essentially the same between 2003 and 2005, those 45,000 lawyers
represent only a little over four percent of the country's population of
active lawyers. The work these lawyers do through PAI programs
represents both a laudable effort and a necessary complement to paid
legal-services work, but at this level of participation it would appear to
be, at best, a valuable insufficiency. Moreover, a recent ABA
publication implies that the LSC-mandated merging and reduction of
legal-services programs that began in the 1990s has put PAI rather
low on reconfigured grantees' list of priorities. 147 PAI programs do
142. Id. at 9. Eleven hundred is less than one percent of the country's active lawyer
population as of 2005. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., BRENNAN CENTER 2003, supra note 27, at 20 (citing the AMERICAN LAWYER
and the NEW YORK TIMES in support of the statement that as of 1999, 'lawyers at the country's
largest law firms" averaged only 36 hours of pro bono a year, down from 56 in 1992); Chaifetz,
supra note 38, at 1696 ("A recent study found that fewer than 20 percent of poor people's legal
needs are adequately addressed, and that under 20 percent of attorneys participate in pro bono
programs.") (citing to AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE
PUBLIC, 1990 DIRECTORY OF PRIVATE BAR INVOLVEMENT PROGRAMS 146-47 (May 1990));
Caroline Durham, Law Schools Making a Difference: An Examination of Public Service
Requirements, 13 LAW & INEQ. 39, 39 (1994) (citing Jason Adkins et al., Campaigning for a Law
School Pro Bono Requirement, 1991 NAT'L ASS'N FOR PUB. INTEREST L. 1, 1 for the proposition
that as of 1991, "only one in six attorneys [was] providing pro bono services"); Eldred &
Schoenherr, supra note 26, at 389 ("According to recent surveys, approximately eighty percent of
the bar engages in no form of pro bono activity on behalf of the poor.").
144. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, LSC STATISTICS: PRIVATE ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT-
PROGRAMS (on file with author).
145. Houseman 2003, supra note 9, at 3.
146. ABA, National Lawyer Population, supra note 12, at 3.
147. McBurney, supra note 51, at 2 (noting that the difficulties inherent in the
reconfiguration process mean that "pro bono appears to be among the least pressing issues
addressed during the first phases of [that] process").
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not, of course, comprise the only pro bono option for members of the
private bar, who may also have firm-sponsored, bar-sponsored, or
independent programs available to them. 148  This plethora of
possibilities does not, however, guarantee actual private-bar
participation in pro bono at either the firm or the individual levels.
For example, as of 2005 there were 155 firm-run pro bono programs in
the United States-and well over 46,000 law firms. 149
Moreover, the emphasis placed on pro bono work at the state-
bar level appears to vary widely between states. Although some state
bar associations place a high institutional priority on the pro bono
performance of their members, "[the] rule is not 'enforced' in most
states; lawyers are not subject to any disciplinary proceeding if they
fail to adhere to the Rule, and the Rule is titled Voluntary Pro Bono
Publico Service."150 Only a few state bar organizations have set their
aspirational pro bono goals commensurate with those set by the ABA
in the Model Rules.1 51 In addition, to date only a few states have
begun to develop a centralized infrastructure, whether via mandatory
reporting 152 or via voluntary surveys,1 53 that could facilitate the
148. Houseman 2003, supra note 9, at 3. Houseman puts the total number of pro bono
programs at 755, of which more than three-quarters are bar-sponsored or freestanding. Id. at 3.
149. Id.; American Bar Foundation, An ABF Update, 16 RESEARCHING LAW 1, 10 (Winter
2005), available at http://www.abfn.org/images/reslawwin05.pdf. The latter statistic dates from
2000; although this footnote presumes that the number of law firms in this country remained
static between that year and 2003, the trend in the statistics recorded by the ABF suggests that
that number probably rose during that time. ABF, supra, at 10. It is, of course, unreasonable to
rebuke for its lack of an in-house pro bono structure a two-to-five-person law firm such as those
that employed 76 percent of private-practice lawyers in 2000. Mkt. Research Dep't, American
Bar Association, Lawyer Demographics (2004), http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/
lawyerdem2004.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ABA, Lawyer Demographics]. If even
the top 5 percent of firms by size ran their own pro bono programs, however, the number of such
programs would increase to almost 2,400-more than fifteen times the current number.
150. Rosas, supra note 38, at 1073-74.
151. States with fifty-hour aspirational goals include the District of Columbia and Maryland.
Barry, supra note 27, at 1885; ABA Standing Comm. on Pro Bono and Pub. Serv., News:
Maryland Court of Appeals Adopts New, Revised Pro Bono Rules, Feb. 7, 2002, http://www.
abanet.org/legalservices/probono/newsarchive.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2006).
152. See, e.g., ABA, SUPPORTING JUSTICE, supra note 140, at 7 (noting that Maryland and
Nevada both have mandatory reporting programs); Mississippi Supreme Court, Mississippi
Rules of Professional Conduct, R. 6.1(e) (amended Mar. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/rules/RuleText.asp?RuleTitle=RULE+6.l+VOLUNTARY+PRO+BO
NO+PUBLIC+SERVICE&IDNum=7 ("Each member of the bar shall annually certify whether
the member has satisfied the member's professional responsibility to provide pro bono legal
services to the poor ... [including] (1) the number of hours the attorney dedicated to pro bono
legal services").
153. See, e.g., ABA, SUPPORTING JUSTICE, supra note 140, at 7-8 (noting that the Missouri,
New York, and Texas bars have all conducted voluntary surveys of pro-bono activity in recent
years).
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impartial and accurate collection of on-the-ground data about pro bono
hours. 1
54
Given this demonstrated gap between aspiration and
accomplishment, one might wonder why the ABA and its state and
local analogues have not stepped in to address the legal-services crisis
by simply requiring some quantity of pro bono work from all members
of the bar. The answer is equally simple: as the following sub-section
illustrates, when mandatory pro bono is broached, lawyers rise up and
argue against it in the most strenuous terms.
3. Private-Bar Objections
This law-trained Hydra has many heads, with many voices.
One of the most popular arguments opposing pro bono holds that it is
fundamentally unfair to require the legal profession to provide its
expertise free of charge, even in the face of extreme need, when such a
requirement is not levied on the members of other professions whose
services could also answer a demonstrated need.155 Another
counterargument takes an administrative tack, arguing that
mandatory pro bono cases "can place considerable pressure on lawyers
who must bill sufficient hours to keep their firms afloat."'156 A third
involves issues of competency. Those putting forth this argument
assert that many members of the bar have little or no education and
experience in legal areas relevant to low-income people. They also
express concern that a mismanaged mandatory system could match a
practitioner in one area with a client needing legal assistance in an
entirely unrelated one, yielding substandard or otherwise problematic
representation and creating inefficiencies where effective service is
perhaps most needed. 157 A related concern centers around the LSC
154. Puzzlingly, the 2005 report on pro bono from the ABA's Pro Bono Committee appears to
have drawn its favorable statistics entirely from personal interviews with the aforementioned
tiny sample of the country's lawyers. At the very least, it contains no indication that the
surveying organization substantiated its findings by contacting any actual pro bono programs of
any kind, whether PAI, bar-sponsored, firm-sponsored, or independent. See generally ABA,
SUPPORTING JUSTICE, supra note 140.
155. Loder, supra note 59, at 464.
156. Barry, supra note 27, at 1886. An ABA fact sheet from 2004 provides some support for
this argument. According to the most recent statistics, sixty-three percent of the country's
private lawyers work alone or belong to a firm with fewer than six members, suggesting that
many lawyers might have some trouble diverting resources from their compensated work. ABA,
Lawyer Demographics, supra note 149.
157. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 27, at 1886-87 (internal citations omitted):
[A] mandatory system that requires a personal injury lawyer to provide pro bono
representation in a landlord/tenant case may not be the most efficient use of this
particular resource ... Too often, large law firms offering to provide pro bono service
will litigate a case well beyond the precepts of good judgment .... In other instances,
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restrictions themselves, the chilling effect of which extends to all work
performed within grantee-facilitated structures, including pro bono,
and which private lawyers may view as too complicated and
constricting to deal with when other worthy causes abound. 158
Many lawyers hold "the traditional view that public service is a
matter of personal charity, to be performed at the discretion of the
individual attorney."159  This view reflects a concern that requiring
public service of attorneys compromises an almost spiritual value that
attaches to such service when performed voluntarily. 60 Some worry
that mandatory pro bono might even "stifle the altruistic tendencies of
lawyers who already serve, or who are so inclined."1 61  Others put
forth theoretical constitutional infractions, 162 articulate concerns that
establishing a bureaucratic structure for mandatory pro bono would be
expensive and intrusive, 163 and reject the idea that lawyers exert
monopolistic control over the legal world.164  Whatever the
counterargument, however, the result is the same: institutional and
individual resistance to mandatory pro bono requirements. Moreover,
ironically, many of the arguments advanced to support that
resistance, particularly those concerned with administrative and
competency issues, could also apply to voluntary pro bono.
attorneys required to provide pro bono service will litigate well below the standards of
sound practice.
See also BRENNAN CENTER 2003, supra note 27, at 20 ("[There are whole areas of law where
private lawyers know little. When those lawyers provide representation in such areas, they must
spend a lot of time mastering the law, and their representation is consequently inefficient.").
158. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 62, at 313-14 ("[W]hy should [a private firm] volunteer to take
federally funded legal[-]services cases when the impact of those precious pro bono hours may be
compromised by the need to observe a set of vastly complicated and confining regulations?").
159. Eldred & Schoenherr, supra note 26, at 368.
160. Id. at 374-75.
161. Loder, supra note 59, at 460.
162. These include an uncompensated-taking argument under the Fifth Amendment, the
idea that mandatory pro bono violates First Amendment freedom of speech and association
rights, and complaints that mandatory pro bono contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection and the Thirteenth Amendment's proscriptions against
involuntary servitude. Thus far, such claims have found little success in courts. Id. at 464-65;
Mogill, supra note 1, at 24.
163. Loder, supra note 59, at 465. Ironically, the PAI programs mandated by the government
via the LSC regulations would seem to require just such a structure. See infra notes 200-201 and
accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Mogill, supra note 1, at 24 ("[C]ritics reason that a law license does not provide
attorneys with monopoly access to the justice system because a party has the right to appear pro
se and that the licensing requirement serves only to assure minimum competency and protect
the public, not to give attorneys a competitive advantage.").
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4. Ethical Issues
In addition to these intra-professional issues, pro bono work
presents the private bar with at least one potential ethical conflict to
which legal-services lawyers are largely immune. In this situation, a
positional conflict arises between the interests of a regular client-
whether former or current-and those of a potential or actual pro bono
client. 16 5 Resolving this conflict implicates the ethical dimension of
several of the Model Rules. For example, "Model Rule 1.9(a) bars a
lawyer from representing a client with interests 'materially adverse to
the interests of [a] former client' where the present representation
concerns 'the same or a substantially related matter' as the former
representation."166 As a practical matter, this conflict may prevent
private firms from being able to perform pro bono work 167 in areas
such as labor and employment law and landlord/tenant law that loom
large for eligible clients. 168 Preventing pro bono work in these areas or
limiting it to consultation with legal-services lawyers, a potential
alternative to direct representation of low-income clients, may put the
private bar in another difficult ethical situation. If, in the course of
consultation, the consulting private lawyer reveals information
protected by an expectation of privacy, "the consulted lawyer and her
firm may be limited in their ability to undertake or continue
representation of their own clients if the representation will be
165. Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat: Positional Conflicts in Service
Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1401, 1414 (1998):
The most obvious positional conflict arises when a lawyer or firm argues one position
on a particular legal question for a client while simultaneously pursuing the exact
opposite position for another client .... Although positional conflicts are most stark in
the context of simultaneous representation, they may also arise in subsequent
representation-that is, between positions taken on behalf of former and present
clients.
166. Id. at 1406.
167. Id. at 1414.
[I]n discussing the possibility of positional conflicts, many [firms] state the issue in
broader terms of paying clients' expectations. As one lawyer for a large national firm
commented: "... I suppose that if a pro bono client walked in the door and wanted to
sue one of our clients, we'd say no. If he wanted us to take a position adverse to the
interests of our paying clients, we would probably refer him someplace else."
Id.; see also BRENNAN CENTER 2003, supra note 27, at 20 ("[T]here are some types of cases-such
as employees' wage, hour and job discrimination cases-that most private lawyers are wary of
handling, because of either real or perceived conflicts of interest.").
168. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST 2005, supra note 11, at 3 (pie chart
illustrating legal issues addressed by LSC grantees in 2002 indicates top four issues were family,
housing, income maintenance, and consumer).
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materially limited by her duty to protect the consulting lawyer's client
information."
169
Even full compliance with the Model Rules' pro bono
requirements on the part of the private bar may make only a dent in
the country's legal-services crisis, particularly in remote areas. 170
"The sheer magnitude of unmet legal needs is best captured by the
opinion of one commentator who ... conservatively concluded that an
additional twenty million hours of annual service would be required to
meet the civil legal service needs of low-income individuals."171
Certainly "[a]n increased commitment to providing pro bono legal
services would have a dramatic impact on fulfilling the ideal of equal
access to justice."172 Twenty-five hours of pro bono work a year from
every active attorney in the country would yield more than twenty-
seven million hours of pro bono legal services; across-the-board
achievement of the ABA's fifty-hour benchmark would result in more
than fifty-five million such hours. 173  Even if across-the-board
compliance with the ABA's nonbinding standard could be achieved
and a basic hour-for-hour match made between need and availability,
however, the uneven regional distribution of lawyers across the
country would render that match problematic. 174  "There is a
particular shortage of pro bono services in rural areas, where there
are few lawyers, and where the few lawyers who do exist rarely work
for the sort of large firms that can afford to contribute vast amounts of
pro bono time."'175 Nor do private firms necessarily have any great
169. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-411 (1998) (discussing
ethical issues in lawyer-to-lawyer consultation). A headnote summary of the previous source is
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethicopinions.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2006).
170. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 27, at 1885 (quoting a recent observation by a judge on the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia "that the problem is so extensive it does not matter
what service contributions lawyers are asked to make").
171. Spain, supra note 61, at 477 (citing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY 241 (1988)). The U.S. Census Bureau indicates that in 1988, the year in which Luban
published his conservative estimate, approximately 42.5 million people were living at or below
125% of the poverty level (the qualifying income parameter for legal aid). U.S. Census Bureau,
Historical Poverty Tables, supra note 36. That number has since risen by more than 7 million.
Id.
172. Spain, supra note 61, at 479.
173. The author came up with these figures by multiplying the number of active lawyers
resident in the U.S. by twenty-five and fifty, respectively. For other relevant figures, see supra
notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
174. The number of lawyers actively practicing in each state varies from 142,538 in New
York to a mere 1,302 in North Dakota. ABA, National Lawyer Population, supra note 12, at 3.
Aid-eligible population also varies by state, as does population in general. States such as North
Dakota, however, present an additional concern: the larger and less populated the area, the more
likely legal-services and private-bar pro-bono lawyers are to be spread thin.
175. BRENNAN CENTER 2003, supra note 27, at 20.
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incentive to contribute funds to legal-services organizations, either in
lieu of or in addition to pro bono hours. Indeed, the private bar may
view federally funded legal services as a bad investment in light of the
LSC's myriad restrictions. 176
IV. FUNDING FRUSTRATIONS: THE BOTTOM LINE ON THE BOTTOM LINE
There is far too much law for those who can afford it and far too little for those who
cannot.177
Compounding the issues of ethics and assistance outlined
above, basic funding for legal services remains uncertain, as does the
existence of the LSC itself. Congressional attacks on legal services
continue. "The legislation [creating the LSC] was reauthorized in
1977, but has not been reauthorized since. In fact, the LSC exists
because it continues to receive appropriations from Congress," and
because its statutory authorization as yet contains no sunset
provision.1 78 Meanwhile, every year congressional appropriations fall
short, not only of what would be necessary to fully fund legal services
on a national level,1 79 but also of what the LSC 180 and other legal-
176. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 62, at 313-14 ("Does it make any sense for [a private firm] to
contribute to an LSC-funded program when its dollars cannot either support real law reform or
address whole areas of concern to poor people?"). Moreover, monetary contributions from the
private bar may have substantially less impact on the legal-services crisis than would real-time
legal assistance, for various complicated reasons. See, e.g., David Luban, Lawyers As Upholders
of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 840-45
(arguing that the provision of pro bono services may be both of more practical use and more
respectful of the client's dignity than cash assistance would be-even if the goal of the pro bono
representation is to obtain money for the client); Mississippi Bar, supra note 152, R. 6.1(b)(1)-(3)
(permitting Mississippi lawyers to discharge their annual aspirational pro-bono responsibility by
providing 20 hours of pro bono legal services-or a $200 contribution to the bar for monetary
support of legal-aid organizations).
177. Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570,
571 (1983).
178. Houseman 1999, supra note 49, at 2191-92.
179. It is difficult to determine precisely how much funding would suffice to meet the needs
of the millions of people currently eligible for legal services without first defining several
threshold variables. See supra note 36. These might include, although they would not be limited
to: the rate of growth or decline of the population eligible for aid over a given fiscal year; the
number and types of legal problems the members of that population are most likely to encounter;
the number of lawyers actively practicing in the legal-services area and the number of lawyers
willing and able to do so given job availability; whether the current restrictions on legal services
remain in force; and the effect of the continuation or cessation of those restrictions on the kinds
and number of legal-services cases brought.
Above all, fully funding legal services would require a threshold definition of what comprises
"sufficient" aid for low-income people. Even accepting the standard Nixon had in mind at the
LSC's inception, that standard envisioned funding two legal-services lawyers per 10,000 poor,
based on an eligible population of 29 million, for a total of 5,800 lawyers. See supra notes 8-10
and accompanying text. Applied to the current income-eligible population, that standard would
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services authorities 8 1 request. The push to drastically reorganize the
LSC, 18 2 privatize it,183 or simply defund it out of existence18 4 remains
strong.
require 9,800 legal-services lawyers. As of 2000, the total number of legal-services lawyers and
public defenders combined numbered only 10,854. ABA, Lawyer Demographics, supra note 149.
The LSC's Justice Gap report conservatively estimates that "to provide necessary access to civil
legal assistance ... will require increasing our nation's capacity to provide [such] assistance to
five times the current capacity." LSC, Justice Gap, supra note 11, at 4.
180. For fiscal year 2004, the LSC submitted a budget request for $352.4 million, a 4.4%
increase over its allocation for fiscal year 2003. It rationalized the increase by pointing out the
rise in the number of aid-eligible people since 1990 and the fact that the requested increase
exceeded by only 0.4 percent "the Administration's stated goal of 4.0% growth for domestic
programs," as announced by the Office of Management and Budget in January 2003. LEGAL
SERVICES CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST 2004, supra note 52, at 1. Instead, Congress allocated
the LSC $338.8 million (the same as the pre-rescission FY 2003 allocation, and $16 million shy of
the LSC's request) and eventually reduced that amount via rescissions to $335.3 million-$1.3
million less than its post-rescission FY 2003 allocation to the LSC. LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST 2005, supra note 11, at 10 n.2.
For fiscal year 2005, the LSC's request stayed static at $352.8 million, but its final funding
allocation actually declined several million from the FY 2004 level, to $330.8 million. LEGAL
SERVICES CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST 2005, supra note 11, at 1; LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION, BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006 1 (2005), available at http://www.
lsc.gov/about/budget/FY06Req.pdf [hereinafter LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST
2006].
For fiscal year 2006, the LSC requested $363.8 million to return it to its approximate FY
2002 funding level vis-h-vis the 7.4-percent inflation between 2002 and 2004. LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST 2006, supra. Instead, Congress further reduced its funding, to a
post-rescission level of $329.8 million as of December 2005. Legal Services Corporation, LSC's
Budget: FY 2006 Appropriation (2006), http://www.lsc.gov/about/FY06app.php (last visited Apr.
30, 2006).
181. See infra note 208.
182. When the LSC Act came up for reauthorization in 1998, the chair of the judicial
subcommittee suggested the following: dismantling the LSC; giving responsibility for federally
funded legal aid to the Department of Justice ("DOJ"); restructuring the program so that the
DOJ would give block grants to states and the states would then re-grant to programs; and
limiting acceptable cases to twelve areas, including such arguably infrequent concerns for low-
income people as probate/estate management and the quieting of title to land. Alexander D.
Forger, Address: The Future of Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 333, 339 (1998).
183. In 1995, Senator Jesse Helms introduced a bill to eliminate the LSC entirely and turn
all administration, funding, and provision of legal aid over to unspecified private entities, on the
ground that the Senate believed "the operations of the Legal Services Corporation are not
essential functions of the Federal Government." Repeal of the Legal Services Corporation Act of
1974, S.958, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995).
184. BRENNAN CENTER 2003, supra note 27, at 6 ("In 2000, the House Appropriations
Committee recommended cutting LSC's 2001 appropriation to $141 million-a familiar proposal
that has become the committee's annual tradition."). The LSC's eventual budget award that year
came to approximately $330 million. Id. See also Hornstein et al., supra note 27, at 1097-98
(internal citations omitted):
[S]ince 1996, the House Appropriations Committee has recommended a fixed $141
million budget for the agency. This recommended budget was about fifty percent less
than what the agency's actual funding levels were for most of the 1990s, and if
approved would have effectively destroyed the agency.... [Tihe House Appropriations
Committee's starvation funding recommendation has occurred each year since 1996.
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Though alternative sources of funding exist,18 5 these sources
have never solved more than a small part of the problem-a fact that
the LSC itself has brought to Congress's attention.18 6 In many areas
of the country, all such sources combined could not support legal
services without the federal funds received through the LSC.
8 7
Moreover, these alternative sources of funding often impose
restrictions on usage that mimic or exceed the federal restrictions.
18
Although funding of this type may serve admirable ends, the services
such funding would support still fail to reach the bulk of the eligible
population. As well, at present, the amount of funding provided by
such sources is stagnant or decreasing.18 9 Furthermore, the private
LSC-funded legal-services offices provide the primary infrastructure supporting pro bono
efforts by firms without in-house programs. Thus, the elimination of the LSC would deleteriously
affect the provision of legal services to income-eligible persons not only by legal-services lawyers
but also by the private bar. Forger, supra note 182, at 342-43.
185. Such sources include state aid, IOLTA funds, private foundations and other private
sources, United Way, filing fee surcharges, abandoned-property funds, punitive damage awards,
and donations from lawyers' groups and individual lawyers. BRENNAN CENTER 2003, supra note
27, at 7-8, 12; Houseman 2003, supra note 9, at 20. In 1999, IOLTA funds "generated over $139
million for legal aid nationwide." BRENNAN CENTER 2003, supra note 27, at 7. By contrast,
"[1]egislatures in at least ten states-including Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming-and the District of
Columbia provide no financial support for civil legal assistance for the poor." Id. at 12. See LSC,
JUSTICE GAP, supra note 11, at 18 (noting that although non-LSC funds have more than tripled
since fiscal year 1981, the real-dollar decline in federal funding over the same period has
essentially negated that increase).
186. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS 2000-2005 1 (2000), available at
http://www.lri.lsc.gov/sd00.pdf ("Many states and local governments do not invest adequate
funds in support of civil legal services ... Private, charitable, pro bono and other contributions
vary widely among States [sic] and programs, and are not sufficient to meet the burden imposed
by inadequate governmental investment.").
187. See, e.g., Houseman 2003, supra note 9, at 20 ("[There are many parts of the country-
the South, Southwest, and Rocky Mountain states-that have not yet developed sufficient non-
LSC funds to operate civil legal assistance, including pro bono programs, without federal
support.").
188. See, e.g., BRENNAN CENTER 2003, supra note 27, at 17:
[L]ack of money is not the only reason that non-federal revenues for legal aid fail to
fill the gap left by decreases in and restrictions on federal legal aid funding. Another
reason is that much of the newly found revenues are either earmarked for certain
populations or purposes or encumbered by restrictions barring their use for certain
populations or purposes. For example, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Montana and West
Virginia all authorize general appropriations or filing fees for legal aid, but all also
earmark these funds exclusively for victims of domestic violence.
See also Houseman 1999, supra note 49, at 2196 ('Many state funding initiatives have also
imposed restrictions similar to those of federal funding sources," including, e.g., restrictions on
abortion-related litigation, lobbying, representing prisoners, representation of illegal aliens, fee-
generating cases, and policy-change-oriented/political training activities).
189. See, e.g., ABA 2006 Budget Recommendations, supra note 27 (noting that the real-dollar
reduction in federal funding over time has been accompanied by "overall economic conditions
[that] have resulted in significant decreases in supplemental funding provided by state and local
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bar shows no significant signs of picking up the slack. Indeed, its
highest-profile professional organization, the ABA, argues publicly
that the solution to the crisis lies in increased federal funding. 190 Nor
does even a significant minority of jurisdictions have an unrestricted
legal-services program (one funded entirely outside the LSC and thus
able to avoid its restrictive regulations), that might be able to accept
cases that are off-limits to LSC grantees.1 9'
Finally, in addition to the external funding issues, both the
LSC Act and the LSC's regulations contain provisions forbidding legal-
services lawyers to take certain otherwise logical actions to bolster
their bottom line. One such prohibited action is representing clients
in suits that might generate plaintiffs' fees. Legal-services lawyers in
these types of cases could put any resultant fee awards into the
organizational coffers. The Act, however, specifies that no LSC funds
shall be used "to provide legal assistance ... with respect to any fee-
generating case" unless "a client seeks only statutory benefits and
appropriate private representation is not available."1 92  The related
LSC regulations mandate that a grantee "may not provide legal
assistance in a fee-generating case" except under certain narrowly
defined circumstances1 93 and that even under those circumstances, a
grantee may not "claim[] or collect and retain" such fees if awarded. 194
This prohibition deprives legal-services lawyers of an otherwise viable
way to supplement inadequate funding and thus expand their
organization's range of services. It also removes from the legal-
sources. For example, while IOLTA income nationwide has declined by 8%, in some states
IOLTA has seen up to a 25% reduction in income.").
190. Id. ("An increase in the appropriation for LSC is the only realistic way that the system
can respond to the overwhelming demand for services."); Ethics Panel, supra note 4, at 366
(responding to the 1996 restriction by stating "that '[i]n the end, the only real solution is for this
country to recognize the need to fully fund lawyers for the poor free from restrictions that
hamper their ability to serve their clients."') (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-399 (1996)).
191. Houseman 1999, supra note 49, at 2201. Houseman notes that such programs exist "[in
sixteen states and in another twenty-six major urban areas," with the latter defined, somewhat
dubiously, as including such locales as Charlottesville, VA (2004 population estimate 36,605;
19th largest city in Virginia in 2000 census), and Saginaw, Michigan (2004 population estimate
59,045; 26th largest city in Michigan in 2000 census). Id.; U.S. Census Bureau, Population
Finder, http://www.census.gov/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2006). By contrast, Knoxville, Tennessee
had an estimated 2004 population of 178,118. Census Population Finder, supra.
192. LSC Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1) (2006).
193. LSC Rule on Fee-Generating Cases, 45 C.F.R. § 1609.3 (2006). Note that with the
exception of actions seeking benefits under two specific provisions of the Social Security Act, all
qualifying circumstances have as a threshold requirement the attempted involvement of the
private bar. Id.
194. LSC Rule on Attorney's Fees, 45 C.F.R. §§ 1642.3-.4 (2006). The latter regulation
makes clear that this ban on attorneys' fees extends to members of the private bar when working
for compensation with a legal-services organization.
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services toolbox a tactic available to other lawyers where such fees are
statutorily available. 195 In some cases, the prohibition against the
acceptance of attorneys' fees even runs afoul of other laws, amplifying
the harm done to the intended beneficiaries of legal aid.196
The second internal funding specification arguably reflects a
singular view of legal-services lawyers on the part of the LSC. The
Act provides that LSC grantees must "adopt procedures for
determining and implementing priorities for the provision of [legal]
assistance" and ensure that "appropriate training and support
services are provided in order to provide such assistance."'197 It also
specifies that the LSC itself must "insure [sic] that grants and
contracts are made so as to provide the most economical and effective
delivery of legal assistance to persons in both urban and rural areas
"... ,,198 Although neither provision textually requires either the
involvement of private attorneys in the provision of legal services or
the devotion of any percentage of LSC funds to facilitate such
involvement, the LSC reads them as mandating that "recipients of
[LSC] funds involve private attorneys in the delivery of legal
assistance to eligible clients."199 To that end, LSC regulations require
that grantees "shall devote an amount equal to at least twelve and
one-half percent... of [their] LSC annualized basic field award to the
involvement of private attorneys in such delivery of legal services ...
195. The collection of awarded fees from a defeated party can have a powerful deterrent
effect on defendants, hitting them in the pocketbook as it does. See, e.g., Ethics Panel, supra
note 4, at 357 ("[Alttorneys' fees can be a significant weapon to use in litigation."); Houseman
2002, supra note 10, at 1230-31 ('Jnder the American system, an award of attorneys' fees is
intended, among other things, to deter and punish illegal conduct by defendants. With the threat
of a possible large attorneys' fee award removed, private parties may feel they can violate poor
people's rights with impunity.") (internal citations omitted); Laurence E. Norton II, Not Too
Much Justice for the Poor, 101 DICK. L. REV. 601, 611 (1997) ("The possibility of having to pay a
large fee award is a powerful motivating factor for defendants to settle these claims early. This
leverage and the benefits it purposefully provides plaintiffs both before and during litigation are
unavailable to the poor."); Rhode 2001, supra note 43, at 1797 ('These lawyers also may not
collect attorneys' fees, which removes an effective deterrent to future abuses and a crucial
funding source for other work.").
196. See, e.g., Houseman 2002, supra note 10, at 1230-31 (internal citations omitted):
The prohibition completely negates the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act, a key
part of the civil rights enforcement structure in this country, and similar fee-shifting
statutes. The prohibition severely undercuts the ability of legal[-] services programs to
effectively represent poor people[,] who are often members of minority groups
intended to be protected by civil rights laws.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C) (2006).
198. Id. § 2996f(a)(3).
199. LSC Rule on Private Attorney Involvement, 45 C.F.R. § 1614.1 (2006). This regulation
specifically takes its authority from the two Act provisions excerpted in the text accompanying
notes 197-198, supra.
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referred to as the 'PAI requirement,"' 200 and that the PAI requirement
may involve "both pro bono and compensated mechanisms." 20 1 Thus,
instead of using their entire LSC grant to fund direct client services,
legal-services organizations must divert a portion of their LSC funds
to pro bono programs-notwithstanding the degree to which legal-
services organizations are already underfunded and must grapple
with the multifarious issues with pro bono outlined above. In addition
to being a budgetary burden, this seems to send a no-confidence
message regarding legal-services lawyers, since nowhere in the
regulations does the LSC articulate any alternate connection that
might exist between the Act's requirement of economic and effective
legal assistance and the need to involve the private bar in the
provision of that assistance.
V. CONCLUSION
[11n a democratic social order, equality before the law is central to the rule of law and to
the legitimacy of the state.
2 02
In a society based on law, justice is available only to those who can make the legal
system work for them. A right is not a right unless it can be enforced; a remedy is not a
remedy if it is available only in theory.
2 0 3
As the above discussion suggests, legal services in the United
States are overburdened, underfunded, and understaffed. This crisis
shows no signs of abating. Indeed, the number of poor is on the rise,
with a concomitant increase in the number of people eligible for
federally funded services.20 4 In a legal system growing ever more
complex, an increase in the needs that eligible parties demonstrate for
such services seems equally likely, if not inevitable.
Hope glimmers in a few areas. In Dobbins v. Legal Services
Corporation, a federal district court levied a preliminary injunction
against the program-integrity requirement as unconstitutionally
restrictive under the First Amendment. 20 5 And the Supreme Court's
200. 45 C.F.R. § 1614.1 (2006).
201. Id. § 1614.2(a).
202. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 25, at 2418.
203. ABA, STANDARDS, supra note 100, at 1.
204. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST 2005, supra note 11, at 1
(noting that "from 1990 to 2000, the number of people living in poverty in all LSC service areas
increased by 5.74%.").
205. Companion case to Velasquez v. Legal Services Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 566, 613
(E.D.N.Y. 2004). Two days after this decision was handed down, the LSC issued a press release
expressing pleasure at the judge's upholding other restrictions at issue in the case (including
those on class actions, client solicitation, and attorneys' fees) and registering its objection to the
program-integrity prong of the holding. Press Release, Legal Services Corporation, Statement of
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decision in Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez re-established the right
of LSC-funded legal-services lawyers to challenge existing welfare law
under certain, very closely cabined circumstances. 206  Although
important, however, the Dobbins and Velasquez decisions pale next to
the myriad remaining restrictions on legal services, which: (1) render
legal-services lawyers legally incapable of living up to their ethical
and professional responsibilities to their clients; (2) further deter
already inadequate pro bono efforts; and (3) prevent legal-aid
programs from doing much more than running in place.
This plethora of problems bedeviling federally funded legal
services involves too many actors, too many voices, and too many
competing needs to be susceptible of any truly simple solution. It
seems possible, however, that some macro-level changes to the way
the federal government manages legal services to low-income people
could improve the situation significantly. In particular, an increase in
congressional allocations to the LSC could significantly affect the
quantity of legal-aid services available to aid-eligible people. Since at
least 1981, the LSC has been severely underfunded, both in real-dollar
terms and with respect to the aid-eligible population. Furthermore,
its recent requests for modest increases over previous years'
inadequate allocations have gone largely unmet. If Congress granted
those requests, the LSC would be better able to carry out the variety
of programs, initiatives, and oversight plans it has developed and
which the budget allocations it requests are carefully calculated to
support.207
the Legal Services Corporation in Response to the Ruling in Dobbins v. LSC by the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York (Dec. 22, 2004),
http://www.lsc.gov/press/122204pr.php (last visited Apr. 30, 2006). In early 2005, the judge who
had issued the preliminary injunction declined to convert it into a permanent one on the ground
that both sides had already appealed the ruling. Velasquez v. Legal Services Corp. and Dobbins
v. Legal Services Corp., 356 F. Supp. 2d 267, 270-72 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
206. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). For an analysis of this case, see, for example, Bornstein, supra note
116, at 697-98 (citing Velasquez, supra, at 543-44) (emphasis added):
Because the LSC funding neither constituted nor was intended to promote
governmental speech, the government was not entitled to impose any viewpoint-based
restrictions.... The Court found that the government was using an existing medium
of expression, legal advocacy, and controlling it, via the restriction against suits for
benefits, in such a way that the implementation of the restriction would have
distorted the usual functioning of the medium. According to the Court, restricting how
LSC-funded attorneys may advise their clients and what arguments these attorneys
may present to the court in suits for benefits sufficiently distorts the functioning of the
judiciary by altering the traditional role of attorneys.
A similar argument could be colorably advanced with regard to many of the 1996
restrictions.
207. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BUDGET REQUEST 2005, supra note 11, at 2-5.
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Congress could also stabilize and regularize the LSC's funding.
For example, each year's budget calculations could include
incremental adjustments pegged to such factors as inflation, cost of
living, and change in the number of aid-eligible persons in the
population. Alternatively, it could use as budgetary benchmarks the
funding suggestions made by groups such as the ABA and the
NLADA. These organizations are comprised of some of the very
people who provide legal services, both full-time and via pro bono
work. Thus, they have a clear idea of what the lawyers' "market" will
bear in terms of contributions to the funding and staffing of legal
services and what proportion of those needs must be met through
federal efforts.
208
In addition, Congress might consider eliminating most, if not
all, of the 1996 restrictions, freeing the LSC to promulgate new,
relaxed regulations that would likely have a broadly beneficial impact
on legal services. Congress could begin by allowing legal-services
lawyers to bring class action suits on behalf of their clients where
appropriate. As a result, the current case-by-case model and its
brutally exclusive triage component 20 9 would be replaced with a
unified approach designed to solve systemic problems for multiple
clients. Utilized appropriately and with professionalism, class action
suits serve the bedrock legal values of efficiency and economy,
functioning as a "remedial device used under narrow circumstances to
achieve consistent resolutions of legal issues .... [and are] an
economical means of obtaining relief. [Fundamentally, they] assure
208. The "street sense" possessed by the ABA and the NLADA can be seen in their recent
budgetary recommendations.
For fiscal year 2006, the ABA's initial budget recommendation was $516.6 million
(subsequently reduced to $363.8 million to match the recommendation made by the LSC's board),
and the NLADA's was $515.57 million. ABA 2006 Budget Recommendations, supra note 27;
Robert J. Grey, Jr., ABA President, Letter to the Honorable Frank R. Wolf and the Honorable
Alan B. Mollohan regarding FY 2006 Funding for the Legal Services Corporation (May 23, 2005),
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/l09thlegalserv/wolfmollohan.pdf (last visited Apr. 30,
2006); NLADA 2006 Budget Recommendations, supra note 41. Note that, although these
numbers are close to $200 million more than the LSC requested for fiscal year 2005, they
represent precisely the same level, adjusted for inflation, at which Congress funded the LSC ten
years ago, prior to the 25-percent reduction in the LSC's budget in 1996 and the post-Census
discovery that the number of those earning at or below the poverty level had risen since 1990. Id.
The NLADA's basic budget recommendation for fiscal year 2007 is $512.74 million, slightly
under its FY 2006 number, but it also urges the LSC to request an additional $30 million for aid
related to Hurricane Katrina and to bump up its fiscal-year 2008 recommendation substantially,
to nearly $700 million. Memorandum from the National Legal Aid and Defender Association to
LSC, Recommendations for FY 2007 Budget Mark for LSC (Sept. 27, 2005), http:H/www.
nlada.org/Civil/NLADANews/2005092952167018/DMS/Documents/1128009734.72 (last visited
Apr. 30, 2006). As of January 2006, neither the ABA nor the LSC had made its FY 2007
recommendation publicly available.
209. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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effective enforcement of judicial decisions and deter unlawful conduct
towards others similarly situated."210  Congress might also consider
honoring the fundamentally American principle of "innocent until
proven guilty" by relaxing the restrictions preventing representation
in civil suits of those incarcerated pre-trial and in public-housing
disputes of those charged with drug-related offenses. Finally,
Congress might eradicate the general ban on fee-generating cases and
relax the strict 12.5 percent PAI requirement. This would allow legal-
services lawyers to grow their own funding through effective work on
their clients' behalf and giving them more flexibility to use their
grants in direct client aid. Taking one or more of these actions could
free legal-services organizations to use their grants in genuinely
efficient and effective ways impossible under the current law and
regulations. Indeed, the ability to accept fee-generating cases, retain
the resultant fees, and bring class action suits might even allow such
organizations to bolster their budgets locally through their own work,
rather than relying on increased federal funding.
These suggestions, which represent only potential solutions to
the problems bedeviling legal services today, are proposed in the spirit
that animated the creation of the LSC more than thirty years ago.
Congress established the LSC as an independent federal corporation
expressly designed "to provide equal access to the system of justice in
our Nation for individuals who seek redress of grievances" and "to
provide high quality legal assistance to those who would be otherwise
unable to afford adequate legal counsel."211 Today, with millions of
income-eligible people going without legal assistance, it cannot
reasonably be argued that these goals have been met. Indeed, the
stark differences between federally funded legal services in 1981 and
the legal-services situation as it currently stands suggest that the
country is actually farther away from that goal today than it was
twenty-five years ago. If high-quality legal assistance of the sort
mandated by the LSC Act continues to be available to only a tiny
minority of those eligible for and in desperate need of it, true equality
of access to justice cannot be achieved. Moreover, if the LSC continues
to be both underfunded and conditionally funded, the benefits
accruing to the LSC's clientele will continue to be outweighed by that
clientele's growing numbers and deepening poverty. Lawyers cannot
in good conscience respond with indifference or acceptance to this
problem and to the restrictions that are driving it, out of respect both
for the dire needs of the poor in this country and for their fellow
210. Houseman 2002, supra note 10, at 1230.
211. LSC Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996(1), (2) (2006).
[Vol. 59:3:9711014
2006] FEDERALLY FUNDED LEGAL SERVICES 1015
practitioners whose professional ethical responsibilities are being
threatened.
212
No civil equivalent of Gideon v. Wainwright currently exists,
vesting in the indigent a right to a fair civil trial via representation. 213
In the current political climate, and given the present composition of
the Supreme Court, recognition of such a right at the federal level
seems unlikely to occur any time soon.214 In the absence of the
systemic protection a civil Gideon would give low-income people
grappling with legal issues, a national legal-services system funded
sufficiently to reach at least a substantial majority of aid-eligible
people and served by lawyers allowed to operate free of unethical
restraints remains the best alternative method by which equal access
to justice may one day be attained.
Liza Q. Wirtz*
212. See, e.g., Ethics Panel, supra note 4. One panelist noted that when Congress enacted the
1996 restrictions, the ABA Ethics Committee "respond[ed] to the LSC restrictions not by
determining whether these restrictions themselves are unacceptable but rather by examining
how lawyers can comply with these restrictions without violating other ethical commands....
[W]e should not assume that the LSC's restrictions are compatible with lawyers' professional
duties." Id. at 371. Another panelist argued that
the preservation of an independent bar is threatened when the professional judgment
of particular groups of unpopular lawyers-such as those representing the poor-is
subjected to restrictions imposed as a result of political decisions by the state. It is
especially troubling to see such restrictions imposed in the face of the longstanding,
and far from adequately implemented, duty of all lawyers to ensure that even those
without funds still have access to the legal system.
Id. at 384.
213. In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held that "in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled [sic] into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him," whether at the state or federal level. 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (emphasis added).
214. Houseman 2003, supra note 9, at 21.
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